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THE FEDERAL OPTION: DELAWARE AS A DE FACTO
AGENCY
Omari Scott Simmons*
Abstract: Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not
adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for
corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in
part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of
interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant
to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly
discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator
remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses a vexing question: Can Delaware, a haven for
incorporation and adjudication, serve as an effective national regulator? Following an analysis
of federal chartering alternatives, such as the Nader Plan, the Warren Plan, the Sanders Plan,
and other modes of regulation, the answer is yes, but with some caveats and qualifications.
Delaware’s adequate, if imperfect, performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate
internal affairs argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework federal
chartering would bring. Even in the contemporary moment where longstanding concerns about
corporate power, purpose, accountability, and the uneasy relationship between corporations
and society are amplified, Delaware can continue to perform an important agency-like role in
collaboration with federal regulators and regulated firms. A deeper examination comparing the
merits of federal corporate chartering with Delaware’s de facto agency function illuminates
the potential of existing and future reforms. This Article concludes that federal chartering
proposals have an important impact despite not being adopted for centuries. First, federal
chartering proposals encourage policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater
hybridization in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering proposals
have historically become successful “à la carte” reforms or part of other successful reform
measures. Third, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool where the
threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to
diverse corporate constituencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States
has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Delaware is the
“Federal Option”1 for corporate law and adjudication, and the
contemporary federal chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on
Delaware’s role. Although the federal government has regulated other
aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations
and preempt Delaware, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not
done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s
jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains
underdeveloped.2 This Article addresses a vexing question: Can
Delaware, a haven for incorporation and adjudication, serve as an
effective national regulator? Following an analysis of alternatives,
including the Nader Group Report of 1976,3 the Accountable Capitalism
Act of 2018 (the “Warren Plan”),4 and the Corporate Accountability and
Democracy Plan (the “Sanders Plan”),5 the answer is yes, but with some
caveats and qualifications. Delaware’s adequate, if imperfect,
performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate internal affairs
argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework
federal chartering would bring—even in the face of longstanding concerns
about corporate power, purpose, and accountability. A deeper
examination comparing the merits of federal corporate chartering with
Delaware’s de facto agency function illuminates the potential of existing
and future reforms.6
1. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 605 (2002).
2. Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1435, 1467 (2008); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 570, 586 (2012); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683–84 (2005); Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1573, 1612 (2005); Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 221 (2015).
3. RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION:
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976).
4. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
5. Corporate
Accountability
and
Democracy,
BERNIE
SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/ER76GYSL?type=image].
6. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, MORTON MINTZ, COLMAN MCCARTHY, SANFORD J. UNGAR, KERMIT
VANDIVIER, SAUL FRIEDMAN & JAMES BOYD, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 264 (1972) (“[L]ittle is gained
when we delude ourselves as to the ease with which human society can be restructured. The cause of
reform, not to mention that of constructive revolution, is too important to be nurtured on anything but
the truth.”); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J.
71, 88 (1972).
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Common and convenient arguments against federal chartering include:
(1) the political opposition argument; that is, federal chartering is
impractical given the inevitable pushback from powerful interest groups,
such as corporate managers;7 (2) the economic argument; that is,
unintended costs and consequences will likely outweigh benefits;8 and
(3) status quo sufficiency arguments; that is, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it.”9 While these responses are relevant, a deeper consideration of the
merits of federal corporate chartering in the contemporary context is
warranted.
Historically and today, the driving force behind federal chartering
proposals has been concern about both corporate power and making large
corporations, particularly management, more accountable to shareholder
and stakeholder interests.10 Proponents view the abuse of corporate power
as a meta-problem, requiring a deep structural, federal-charter-based
remedy.11 Even putting aside the potential implementation challenges of
federal chartering, substantive federal reforms have been and can be
achieved without it. Federal chartering is simply one method along a
continuum, which includes: (1) federal licensing; (2) a comprehensive
federal corporate code; (3) incremental federal corporate regulation;12
(4) external federal stakeholder regulation;13 (5) state social enterprise
7. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1499–508 (1992); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 709, 720–25 (1987) (arguing that Delaware’s success in the chartering market results from
Delaware’s superior ability to minimize transaction costs); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 225, 281 (1985) (arguing that national
corporate chartering would impose a welfare loss on shareholders because the federal government
cannot offer transaction-specific assets as hostages to safeguard the investments of firms).
9. For example, a recent publication authored by Marcel Kahan uses the status quo sufficiency
argument by asserting “Delaware law works at least tolerably well, so why take a chance and replace
it with some unknown federal rules.” Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for
Incorporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 105, 127
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
10. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933); NADER ET AL., supra note 3.
11. See infra Part II.
12. Examples include federal reforms that affect internal corporate affairs such as executive
compensation, auditing, board composition, and board committees. See infra Part V.
13. Examples include federal regulatory statutes that address stakeholder concerns outside the
corporate law context, such as labor, antitrust, banking, and environmental law. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–
78mm). For the 1933 Act, see Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
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statutes; (6) market forces; and (7) self-regulation.14 In the absence of
federal chartering, these other reform methods can be combined and
configured in multiple ways to creatively address manager, shareholder,
and broader stakeholder interests. They are also more politically feasible
than a federal corporate chartering regime.
Part I of the Article discusses Delaware’s function as a de facto agency,
focusing on its unique institutional dynamics and relationship to federal
regulators. Part II analyzes the longstanding federal chartering debate
from several perspectives: historical, academic, political, economic, and
interest-group dynamics. Part III examines three contemporary federal
chartering proposals: the Nader Group Report of 1976; the Accountable
Capitalism Act of 2018 (the “Warren Plan”)15; and the Corporate
Accountability and Democracy Plan (the “Sanders Plan”).16
Part IV explores the possible efficacy of a future federal chartering
regime. First, it describes implementation challenges, the politicization of
internal corporate affairs, and the adversarial versus cooperative
relationship a federal chartering regime envisions between the federal
government and state law regimes like Delaware. Next, it points to other
barriers in the contemporary context: the rise of impact investing,
evolving expectations for corporate managers, risk of capital migration,
and political considerations. Finally, despite its position that federal
chartering is not suited to the contemporary context, it identifies three
scenarios where, in theory, federal chartering may be warranted: (1) if
state benefit-corporation statutes become a blueprint (i.e., state laboratory
argument); (2) if companies adopt federal charters as a condition of
receiving a federal bailout or other significant government support; and
(3) if companies adopt a federal charter as a mechanism to receive
amnesty from severe penalties and sanctions.
Part V explores alternatives to federal chartering: federal licensing, a
comprehensive federal corporate code, incremental federal corporate
legislation, external federal stakeholder regulation, state social enterprise
statutes, market forces, and self-regulation. It predicts that contemporary
federal chartering proposals or an expansive federal corporate code will
not be adopted. Nevertheless, the mere threat of their adoption may
influence negotiation and compromise, bringing regulators, corporate
§§ 77a-77aa); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69); Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53).
14. See L. E. Birdzell, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Corporation: The Case for the Federal
Chartering of Giant Corporations, 32 BUS. LAW. 317, 318 (1976).
15. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
16. See Corporate Accountability and Democracy, supra note 5.
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managers, and other constituencies to coalesce around less intrusive forms
of regulation as alternatives. Hence, the more likely regulatory responses
are incremental encroachment on Delaware law and more robust external
federal stakeholder regulation. Self-regulation (e.g., environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) initiatives) will also play a prominent role
and mollify public fervor for more intrusive federal regulation.
Part VI illustrates the implications of the contemporary federal
chartering debate. Despite dim prospects of adoption, the federal
chartering debate prompts a more robust discussion of alternatives and
possibilities beyond the status quo. Delaware’s effectiveness as a de facto
agency, coupled with other available forms of corporate regulation,
renders contemporary proposals for mandatory or even voluntary federal
chartering premature and superfluous. Nevertheless, contemporary
federal chartering proposals reflect a longstanding tension between the
exercise of corporate power and broader stakeholder concerns. This
tension underlies the important trend of hybridization in regulatory design
as well as corporate practice to accommodate the interests of multiple
corporate constituencies with diverse motives.17 The contemporary ESG
focus and proliferation of social enterprise statutes are an outgrowth of
this trend toward hybridization. The emergent ESG landscape is
pressuring federal, state, and firm self-regulatory regimes to
accommodate broader stakeholder concerns. Despite not being adopted
for centuries, federal chartering proposals have an important impact in the
contemporary context. First, federal chartering proposals encourage
policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater hybridization
in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering
proposals have historically become successful “à la carte” reforms or part
of other successful reform measures. Third, federal chartering proposals
provide value as a bargaining tool where the threat of more intrusive
federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to diverse
corporate constituencies.
I.

DELAWARE AS A DE FACTO AGENCY

Delaware’s dominance as a premier jurisdiction for corporate
chartering and adjudication is well established. Over 60% of U.S. publicly
traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware, making it the nation’s

17. See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Judging the Public Benefit Corporation, in 20 THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 354, 354–55 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W.
Yockey eds., 2018) (illustrating how ESG and public benefit corporations reflect this hybridization
trend).

Simmons (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/11/2021 4:01 PM

THE FEDERAL OPTION

941

corporate capital.18 Consequently, “[t]he aggregated choices of a majority
of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on the
[Delaware General Corporation Law and Delaware common law
precedents] as a de facto national corporate law.”19 Moreover, “[f]or at
least half a century the Delaware courts have been the de facto ‘national’
U.S. corporate law courts.”20
A.

Corporate Lawmakers

Lawmakers supply the service of law and regulation to corporate
constituents. Law is created in different ways—through the legislative
process, the judicial process, and adoption of norms and customs—each
having its own challenges.21 In the corporate governance context, law and
regulation suppliers are not monolithic and may have separate agendas.22
The primary suppliers are Delaware (primarily Delaware state courts and
18. See Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/03/the-delaware-delusion/ [https://per
ma.cc/TWE3-XNAK] (discussing Delaware’s dominance in the corporate law market).
19. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 329, 331 (2001) (discussing distribution of shareholding within a country). “The
aggregated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence
on the [DGCL] as a de facto national corporate law.” Id. at 350. See generally Brian Broughman,
Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. &
ECON. 865 (2014).
20. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345, 1398 (2012). Armour, Cheffins, and Black comment on the ubiquitous nature of Delaware law:
Delaware law is a central part of the business law curriculum in most major U.S. law schools.
The official comments accompanying the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), a model
law followed by twenty-four states, frequently refer to Delaware cases to provide examples to
explain the drafters’ choices. Courts in other states often cite and follow Delaware case law when
their own case law is sparse. Courts in MBCA states sometimes cite Delaware jurisprudence in
preference to decisions from other MBCA states.
Id. at 1398–99. William T. Allen, former Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery, describes
Delaware’s preeminence:
My speculation is that the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that choose Delaware have it
right. The IPO market and the secondary market trust the system of the Delaware corporation
law to be systematically fair. That, of course, doesn’t mean that all market participants will
approve each element of the system—or each court ruling or statutory amendment. Any
particular decision may generate disagreement, disapproval or dissent, but year upon year the
system taken as a whole plausibly balances deference to management’s need for broad discretion
in deploying the firm’s capital with protection of shareholder basic interest . . . . In doing so,
Delaware law provides an outstanding public service to the nation.
William T. Allen, Whence the Value-Added in Delaware Incorporation?, CORP. EDGE (Div. of
Corps., Dover, Del.), Fall 1997, at 3 (on file with author). The Corporate Edge was a quarterly
newsletter published by the Delaware Department of State’s Division of Corporations. The newsletter
went out of print in 2001.
21. See generally Francesco Parisi, Sources of Law and the Institutional Design of Lawmaking, 19
J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 95 (2001).
22. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 323 (2009).
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its General Assembly) and the federal government (primarily the
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress). Additional
suppliers of corporate regulation include other government agencies, such
as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and self-regulatory organizations
(SROs), such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).23
This Article focuses on two lawmaking bodies—Delaware and the
federal government. Traditionally, Delaware law has governed corporate
internal affairs, while the SEC has addressed external issues of securities
trading and disclosure. Their interaction and separate spheres of influence
often “determine whose interests and which ideas dominate American
corporate law.”24 Note that “[t]he dominant ideas and interests in
Delaware [may] differ from those in Washington.”25 The list of suppliers
or lawmakers noted above reflects the scope of traditional corporate law
and does not address the entire matrix of business regulation.26 There is
an important distinction between traditional corporate law and laws
affecting corporations, which include other types of regulation, such as
labor, antitrust, and environmental laws.27
B.

Delaware’s Institutional Dynamics

Unique institutional features bolster Delaware’s de facto agency role.
Its judiciary—that is, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware
Supreme Court—is the primary corporate lawmaking body; its General
Assembly plays a secondary role.28 In addition, institutional alignment
23. The SEC is accountable to Congress, and SROs are indirectly controlled by the SEC. Mark J.
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 598–600 (2003). SRO rules are subject to
approval by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1).
24. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005).
25. Id.
26. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30–32 (1986) (distinguishing between
traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). Examples of other laws affecting
corporations include other types of regulation, such as environmental, labor, health, and safety
regulations. Id.
27. Id.
28. Former Governors of Delaware succinctly explained Delaware courts’ lawmaking role:
Delaware’s judiciary is a crown jewel of the State. Delaware’s courts, and in particular its Court
of Chancery, enjoy a reputation of excellence in the nation and around the world. The Court of
Chancery’s expertise in corporate law is recognized as preeminent in the nation, having been
developed over the course of “thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of
Delaware’s corporate law.
Brief for Former Governors of the State of Delaware as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4,
Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (No. 19-309) [hereinafter Brief for Former
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among key state actors and a stable political climate contribute to its
competitive advantage.29 For example, the relationship between the
Delaware corporate bar, the General Assembly, the Division of
Corporations, and the judiciary is collaborative.30 Influential groups, such
as the state judiciary and the local bar, maintain a robust “collegial
interaction,” and the General Assembly pays deference to the corporate
bar.31 Few legislative pressures disrupt the development of law, and
stakeholder groups––unions, environmental groups, and local
communities––exercise little pressure.32
Delaware is often criticized for what observers call a pro-management
bias, reflected in its law.33 However, appointed judges in its “plaintiffdriven system are not as sensitive to interest-group pressures.”34 For
example, Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery judicial
officers are selected by a bipartisan judicial nominating commission and
are ultimately appointed by Delaware’s Governor for twelve-year terms.35
Governors of Delaware] (citation omitted) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. L. 351,
354 (1992)).
29. Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 9–10 (“The consistency that Delaware
furnishes in pronouncing the de facto corporate law of the United States has been a significant benefit
to American businesses seeking capital in the domestic and international markets.” (citing Simmons,
supra note 2, at 239 (“Delaware corporate law functions as a common language or lingua franca
among domestic and foreign firms, investors, bankers, and legal advisors.”))).
30. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1940 (1998); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 324–25; E. Norman Veasey,
“I Have the Best Job in America,” 13 DEL. LAW. 21, 23 (1995) (asserting that the Delaware Supreme
Court has “excellent relations with the other two branches of state government”). E. Norman Veasey,
the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, commented on Delaware’s cooperative
atmosphere:
Delaware’s size as the “small wonder” gives us an enormous advantage, particularly when
coupled with the intelligence, approachability, cooperation and integrity of our public office
holders. All three branches of government in Delaware are keenly aware of the reputation of the
judicial branch of government and of the enormous contribution that the judicial branch makes
to Delaware’s economy and to the well-being of our citizens. Delaware’s judicial branch must,
however, continuously explain and justify its processes to the other two branches and to the
citizenry. We are making that effort. But, we need the help of the organized Bar, and we need
for the other two branches of government to examine, advise, hear and support us.
Id. at 22.
31. See Cary, supra note 7, at 692 (“[Delaware has] in microcosm the ultimate example of the
relationship between politics, the bar, and the judiciary. . . . [I]t is clear that Delaware may be
characterized as a tight little club in which the corporate bar cites unreported decisions before the
courts in which they practice.”).
32. See id.
33. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 74–75.
34. Simmons, supra note 22, at 325.
35. Del.
Exec.
Order
No. 4,
(2001)
https://archivesfiles.delaware.gov/ExecutiveOrders/Minner/Minner_EO04.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K99-SS8B]. In theory, twelve-year
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In addition, the State Constitution mandates a political balance on the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery.36 Such
independence arguably gives court opinions more legitimacy than some
legislative outcomes. Delaware is largely insulated from populist
concerns that are palpable at the national level, except to the extent that
the federal government makes state lawmakers aware of their potential
encroachment on state law.37 Due to these contextual factors, managers
and shareholders are the primary interest groups influencing Delaware
corporate lawmaking. The federal government can be viewed as another.38
Recently, similar to other states, Delaware has responded to stakeholder
concerns by adopting a public benefit corporation statute.39 The
widespread adoption of state social enterprise statutes has implications for
the contemporary federal chartering debate: forestalling greater federal
encroachment and potentially weakening the argument for federal
chartering.
C.

Federal Lawmaking

Compared to Delaware, federal government lawmaking is more
pluralistic and involves more interest groups that reflect stakeholder and
populist concerns.40 However, it demonstrates some reluctance to directly
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs and to alter existing power
relationships between managers and shareholders.41 Instead, it prefers to
use more moderate forms of regulation, such as disclosure, potentially to
prevent and to mollify political backlash from powerful corporate
appointments limit the impact of electoral swings on judicial decision-making. Also, twelve-year
terms and the prospect of not being reappointed may serve as a compromise to life tenure that may
lessen accountability. For a critique of life tenure for federal judges, see Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 769 (2006).
36. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
37. See Roe, supra note 24, at 2501.
38. Simmons, supra note 22, at 325.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (West 2021).
40. See Roe, supra note 24, at 2518–19. Mark Roe describes the broader interests implicated at the
federal level:
More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-regarding policymakers
in Washington see themselves as custodians for the overall health of the American economy;
accordingly, they could conclude that tight managerial accountability—beyond that which even
interests institutional investors—would be best for the economy. The Council of Economic
Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and the SEC often proposes rules that
managers and institutional investors dislike. Of course, we shouldn’t naïvely think that interests
don’t influence these players too, but the interests differ from Delaware’s, and sometimes the
public-policy players have enough slack to be able to act on their ideological preferences.
Id. at 2503.
41. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 328.
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constituencies.42
The federal government may be more likely to address populist
concerns, but increased interest-group pluralism does not necessarily
negate manager and shareholder influence. Even if lawmakers enact more
laws and regulations, the degree of enforcement determines their impact.43
Passing public-regarding reforms may differ from earnestly pursuing the
public interest.44 Knee-jerk and ad hoc responses and cosmetic, largely
symbolic measures can be used to mitigate outrage from sometimes lessinformed corporate constituencies.45
D.

The Agency Analogy

Given its institutional dynamics and its influence on U.S. corporate
law, Delaware—particularly its judiciary—functions like a de facto
agency. One observer describes Delaware’s agency-like role as follows:
[The Chancery] is an exceptional court because it can be fairly
described this way: as a governmental entity, directed by expert
decision makers and assisted by a cadre of governmentsupervised enforcement attorneys, armed with substantial
rulemaking and adjudicating authority over the conduct and
disclosure of transactions within its jurisdictional compass, and
charged with using that authority to regulate a broad field of
economic activity. Because Chancery sees and has the power to
regulate a vast amount of M&A activity, its perspective is not
episodic or narrow, but constant and, if not complete, very
substantially representative. In all of these respects, it resembles
a regulatory agency.46
Typically, agencies function as rule makers with an eye to the future;
they solicit comment from those who will be affected by regulations and
the adoption of broader rules.47 By contrast, courts, as rule makers, look
to the past and are mostly constrained to apply rules to situations with
specific actors. 48 Accordingly, the “rules resulting from [administrative]
rulemaking are generally thought to be more effective regulatory
instruments—because their benefits and costs in the mine run of cases are

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
Savitt, supra note 2, at 586.
Id. at 586–87.
Id.
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more thoroughly examined before adoption.”49 The Delaware Court of
Chancery is able to operate as a de facto agency because of its deep
expertise and wide exposure to relevant law. Therefore, it can issue more
future-minded and forward-looking decisions without focusing only on
the parties before the court. Like an agency issuing regulations, it issues
dicta and pronouncements to influence future transactions.50
The idea of courts serving as a regulatory agency is not far-fetched
since the federal courts implement the antitrust laws using common law
methodology.51 Some agencies such as the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) rely exclusively on adjudication to develop and enforce
regulation.52 Most agencies (e.g., Federal Trade Commission (FTC)) use
adjudication to some extent when adopting new or revised regulatory
policy.53 Some academics assert the tort law system, driven by private
plaintiffs, has regulatory effects.54 Despite the similarities between courts
and agencies, there is a salient point of differentiation. All federal
regulatory schemes are monopolies that companies cannot opt out of. By
contrast, companies choose whether or not to incorporate in Delaware.
One must concede that Delaware in this respect is unique.
Delaware’s sustained function as a de facto agency is contingent upon
a continuous wealth of cases (e.g., fiduciary duty) before its courts rather
than litigation in different jurisdictions.55 According to one observer,
“[e]ach case lost to another state is a lost opportunity to expand and refine
Delaware fiduciary law. And because the courts of other states necessarily
have less experience applying Delaware law, out-of-Delaware cases may
be more opaque to defendants trying to predict and manage transactional
risk.”56 Delaware offers network benefits, such as providing litigants with
49. Id. at 587.
50. See id. at 588–89; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811,
1854–55 (2001).
51. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349
(2013); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute Thirtieth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and
Policy (Oct. 23, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/common-law-approach-and-improvingstandards-analyzing-single-firm-conduct [https://perma.cc/CR2Y-SLZY] (“I will focus on how a
common law approach to antitrust has led [the United States] toward an objective, transparent and
economically based standard for assessing single firm conduct.”).
52. See generally Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969)
(explaining the FTC’s use of adjudication when revising regulations).
54. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 54–58 (1999).
55. Savitt, supra note 2, at 598.
56. Id. at 599.
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similar standards, that generate predictability for business planning.57
Delaware’s de facto agency role and lawmaking function do raise
concerns and criticisms. Some historic and contemporary critics assert
that Delaware judges cannot be impartial because local interest groups,
focused on securing lucrative corporate franchise fees and legal work,
promote a pro-management ideology.58 These critiques, however, ignore
structural safeguards designed to mitigate politicization and promote
greater independence; for example, the bipartisan judicial nominating
commission for selection, political balancing, and twelve-year term
appointments.59
Completely eradicating all politicization of the judiciary would be a tall
task, but scholars acknowledge that certain measures can mitigate the
influence of politics and ideology on judicial decision-making.60 Public
choice scholars contend regulatory agencies are composed of self-seeking
individuals.61 But they often ignore the role of formal and informal norms
in agencies that may deter self-interest or one-sidedness. For example,
professionalism is a key disciplining norm for agencies as well as courts.62
By nature, courts are more apolitical than agencies yet not immune from
interest group pressures or ideology.63 However, professionalism, in part,
57. See id. at 577–85.
58. Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1499–508; Cary, supra note 7, at 666; Macey & Miller, supra note
7, at 472.
59. See Brief for Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 3, Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (No. 19-309) (“[T]he Framers
of the Delaware Constitution of 1897 established a partisan balance requirement providing that no
more than a bare majority of the state’s ‘law judges’ be members of the same political
party . . . . These provisions have functioned to minimize the role of politics in Delaware’s judicial
selection process, protecting public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and avoiding single
party entrenchment.”); Id. at 24 (“To foster judicial independence, Delaware judges serve lengthy 12year terms, potentially giving governors the ability to shape the composition of the bench long after
their time in office. The partisan balance requirements further ensure that the governor of a state
whose citizens hold a wide range of views cannot structure a judiciary with a predominant or
homogenous judicial philosophy.”).
60. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative Law:
Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV 319, 355 (2012).
61. See generally James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public
Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James M.
Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 2009).
62. See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2012).
63. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
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deters judicial officers from being ideologues because their reputation,
which they presumably care about, is determined by the degree of
professionalism they exhibit. Delaware judicial officers ascribe to a
salient professionalism norm given the reach and impact of their
decisions.
In any case, administrative agencies are far from a panacea for
corporate problems. Federal regulation has its limitations. Although the
views of regulated industries are relevant to the lawmaking process, they
often prove determinative, crowding out the views of less organized but
important interest groups. Even worse, agencies may be captured by the
industries they regulate.64 Inevitably, their effectiveness relies on industry
expertise, information, and cooperation.65 Even assuming agencies are
staffed by virtuous public servants with no ambitions to secure lucrative
jobs in industry, they are still dependent on political bodies like Congress
for appropriations. These concerns are not reasons to abandon the
regulatory process or to suggest that it lacks benefit. Instead, they stand
as a reminder of its inherent limitations.
The recent Supreme Court case Carney v. Adams66 underscores
Delaware’s role as a de facto regulator.67 The Third Circuit ruled that
Delaware’s
judicial
political
balancing
provisions
were
unconstitutional.68 Specifically, the decision addressed the
constitutionality of article IV, section 3 of the Delaware Constitution,
which provides, in relevant part, that (1) courts in Delaware cannot have
more than a bare majority of justices from one political party (the Bare
Majority Provision); and (2) the justices of the Supreme Court, the
Superior Court, and the Court of Chancery must all be members of one

political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
64. See Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of
Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 624 (2010).
65. Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125,
1129–30 (1976); Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside
Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2013).
66. 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020).
67. Adams v. Carney, No. CV 17-181-MPT, 2018 WL 2411219 (D. Del. May 23, 2018), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. granted
sub nom. Carney v. Adams, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and remanded,
Carney, 141 S. Ct. 493.
68. Adams, 922 F.3d at 169.
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major political party or the other (the Major Party Provision).69
A U.S. Supreme Court Brief from Former Governors of the State of
Delaware as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner counters that the
“impact of Delaware’s constitutional commitment to political balance has
been profound.”70 It points out that “[c]ross-party judicial appointments
are a rarity in the federal courts” but not in Delaware.71 This brief
articulates the potential consequences of striking down Delaware’s
judicial political balancing provisions:
Without the draw of Delaware’s specialized, nonpartisan
judiciary, entities may choose to incorporate in different
jurisdictions throughout the country, thereby irreparably
fragmenting the nation’s currently unified corporate law. The
consistency that Delaware furnishes in pronouncing the de facto
corporate law of the United States has been a significant benefit
to American businesses seeking capital in the domestic and
international markets.72
The brief adds: “Should the articulation of corporate law become
scattered across numerous jurisdictions, reconsolidation would be
difficult or impossible.”73 Further it acknowledges that “[t]he loss of
Delaware’s status as the center of United States corporate law, anchored
by a specialized, nonpartisan judiciary, would harm Delawareincorporated businesses nationwide.”74
In reaching its conclusions, the Third Circuit made the blanket
determination that judicial figures cannot be policymakers.75 It ignored
“characteristics that cause [Delaware’s judicial lawmaking] to resemble
the legislative process” and a de facto agency.76 They include, inter alia,
a skeletal statutory corporate law framework that leaves the fundamental
rights and obligations of stockholders and directors to be “supplied by
judges, performing their traditional roles of making and applying common
69. Id. at 170–71 (describing the Bare Majority Provision and the Major Party Provision); see
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide if a State Can Consider Political Affiliation in Appointing
Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/supreme-courtpolitical-affiliation-judges.html [https://perma.cc/YV4M-XS5G].
70. See Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 5.
71. See id. at 5–6.
72. See id. at 9 (citing Simmons, supra note 2, at 239).
73. See Brief for Former Governors Delaware, supra note 28, at 10.
74. Id.
75. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Carney
v. Adams, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and remanded, Carney v. Adams,
592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020).
76. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1075, 1079 (2000).
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law.”77 Delaware’s judiciary is entrusted with the creation of corporate
law and policy and functions as a de facto agency.78 The legitimacy of the
U.S. corporate governance system, of which Delaware is an integral part,
largely hinges on the perception that it is largely apolitical, less biased,
and fair, even to non-prevailing parties.79 In Delaware, the legal
environment is stable, contributing to and reinforcing a stable climate for
investment and business planning. The apparent lack of politicization and
flip-flopping that characterize other jurisdictions make Delaware a more
attractive venue for resolving corporate disputes. Recently, the U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed the Adams case on standing grounds, keeping
Delaware’s judicial balancing provisions intact but leaving questions
regarding their constitutionality unresolved.80
II.

THE FEDERAL CHARTERING DEBATE

Major U.S. corporations are global in scope and impact, but the laws
under which they are created and acquire their legal character are mostly
local. From this tension emerges the desire to subject them to federal law.
The longstanding federal corporate chartering debate is, in essence, a
referendum on the legitimacy of Delaware’s shared role in U.S. corporate
governance. It raises crucial questions about such reform objectives as
(1) limiting the power of corporations within society; and (2) ensuring
corporate managers exercise their power with greater accountability for
shareholder and stakeholder interests.
A.

The Recurrence of Federal Corporate Chartering Proposals

Despite over two centuries of debate, federal corporate chartering
proposals have not become law.81 Their advancement exhibits an
77. Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in
Which It Is Equitable to Take that Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft,
60 BUS. LAW. 877, 879 (2005).
78. Id. Other Chancery Court features are administrative in nature. For example, “[w]ithout the
need for a live controversy, the Court of Chancery may hear applications to validate defective
corporate acts, order the Delaware Secretary of State to accept the filing of certain instruments, declare
stock issuances to be effective, and order the holding of stockholder meetings or director elections.”
Brief for Former Governors of Delaware, supra note 28, at 13–14.
79. For a general discussion of the concept of legitimacy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy
and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1827 (2005). See also Omari Scott Simmons, Picking
Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2009).
80. Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493, 503–04 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
81. Although beyond the scope of this Article, banking is regulated at both the federal and state
levels. Federal bank chartering is employed in the banking context where the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has extensive powers over banking practices. In 1863, Congress
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interesting pattern. They arise when public sentiment and concern
“mounts about the concentration of corporate economic and political
power.”82 They often coincide with periods of economic turmoil and
social upheaval, when other types of corporate reform legislation are
passed.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, James Madison twice
proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that the Constitution expressly authorize
Congress to grant corporate charters where public goods so require and
where a single state authority may not be competent.83 States initially
managed corporations through short-term, state-issued charters, which
maintained corporate compliance under threat of nonrenewal.84 However,
corporate power significantly strengthened with the expansion of
domestic and interstate markets.
Advocacy for federal incorporation in the 1880s contributed, in part, to

created the OCC as part of the National Currency Act to regulate and charter national banks. See Act
of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668 (repealed 1864). In 1864, the National Bank Act
replaced the National Currency Act. See Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The OCC has multiple objectives including ensuring the soundness
of the national banking system. See generally Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52
VA. L. REV. 565 (1966) (discussing the history of the National Banking Act); Larry Yackle, Federal
Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the Progressive Era: A Case Study of Smith v. K.C. Title and Trust
Co., 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 255 (2013).
82. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1126.
83. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 183 (1990);
see also CHARLES PERROW, ORGANIZING AMERICA: WEALTH, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF
CORPORATE CAPITALISM 32 (2005) (“[In the eighteenth and nineteenth century,] [c]itizens and elites
recognized . . . that permitting the existence of large organizations that were primarily responsive only
to owners, and not to the public, was a fateful act.”). Federal chartering received at least brief
consideration during the Constitutional Convention, however. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 944 n.19 (1952); Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation:
Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 412 (1997). There was an
Incorporation Committee, but apparently it did little. See Mark, supra, at 412. When Benjamin
Franklin proposed that the federal government be granted the power to cut canals, James Madison
moved that an amendment be made to provide the power “to grant charters of incorporation where
the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of the individual States may be
incompetent.” Id. (quoting DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE
AMERICAN STATES 724 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927)). Rufus King, chair of the Incorporation
Committee, argued that the proposed power was “unnecessary” and that the states “will be prejudiced
and divided into parties.” Mark, supra, at 412. The proposed amendment failed, by a vote of three
states in favor and eight against. Id.
84. See Charlie Cray, Using Charters to Redesign Corporations in the Public Interest, in THE
BOTTOM LINE OR PUBLIC HEALTH 303 (William H. Wiist, ed., 2010). Corporate charters originally
defined a corporation’s purpose, and when a corporation violated (or acted outside of) its stated
purpose, the state legislature could dissolve the corporation. See generally Kent Greenfield & D.
Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2008).
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the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”).85 In addition
to the passage of the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Tillman Act of
190786 to restrict corporate power by limiting corporations and banks from
making federal campaign contributions.87 By the twentieth century,
Progressive Era reformers perceived “bigness” as a threat to democratic
institutions, and a federal incorporation framework, although never
adopted, was perceived as a potential solution.88
Twenty different corporate chartering-related bills were introduced in
Congress between 1903 and 1914;89 none became law. Presidents
Theodore Roosevelt, Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson all voiced
support for a federal corporate chartering or licensing scheme in their
annual State of the Union Addresses.90 In his first address to Congress in
85. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7); see Susan
Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of
Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 117 (1999) (“[T]he Sherman Act deliberations involved
discussions of federal incorporation, [but] the final statute left the primary power to charter
corporations with the states.”); see also WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 63, 85–99 (1956) (discussing the strong
sentiments against monopolies implicated in corporation law and analyzing the legislative history of
the Sherman Act).
86. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
87. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a)).
88. In 1898, Congress established the Industrial Commission to investigate and propose national
policy on various industrial and commercial issues. See Act of June 18, 1898, ch. 466, 30 Stat. 476.
In 1902, the Commission’s final report suggested federal chartering may limit corporate “bigness.”
U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 57-380, at
643, 651 (1st Sess. 1902) (“Federal supervision, under some form, which may control the
combinations doing an interstate business, is therefore of chief importance. . . . [If supervision alone
fails to curb corporate abuses,] it may be wise for the Congress to enact a Federal incorporation law.”);
see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 160, 180 (1982) (“On January 7, 1910, Taft sent a message to Congress calling upon it to pass
a federal incorporation law. The vagueness of certain parts of the Sherman Law, the conflicting
interpretations handed down in different federal courts, the interstate nature of big business all called
for new means to control unlawful suppression of competition while reassuring honest businessmen
of the legitimacy of their actions.”). At the 1899 Chicago Conference on Trusts, William Jennings
Bryan, the 1896 and 1900 Democratic presidential candidate, endorsed federal chartering. See
Urofsky, supra, at 165–66. Bryan’s federal chartering proposal required a federal charter for
companies to do business outside their home state of incorporation, which would only be granted if
the firm met strict capitalization and business policy requirements, and the firm was not a monopoly.
See id. at 166. If a corporation attempted to create a monopoly or violated any other federal chartering
rules, then their charter would be revoked. Id.
89. FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 70–92, at 32–51 (1st Sess. 1934).
See CLINARD, supra note 83, at 183.
90. Roe, supra note 24, at 602. For a broader discussion of presidential endorsements of federal
chartering, see Joel F. Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 919 (1972), and Comment, A Federal System of Licenses and
Charters, 25 GEO. L.J. 700, 704 (1937) (exploring Theodore Roosevelt’s strong support of federal
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1901, Teddy Roosevelt stated, “the Government should have the right to
inspect and examine the workings of the great corporations engaged in
interstate business.”91 He proposed a new Bureau of Corporations as an
extension of the Department of Commerce, while Congress
simultaneously considered a federal incorporation bill.92 Roosevelt was a
major proponent of federal incorporation, expressing his support for
federal chartering in a 1905 message to Congress:
Experience has shown conclusively that it is useless to try to get
any adequate regulation and supervision of these great
corporations by [S]tate action. Such regulation and supervision
can only be effectively exercised by a sovereign whose
jurisdiction is coextensive with the field of work of the
corporations—that is, by the [N]ational [G]overnment.93
Ironically, Roosevelt is indirectly responsible for Delaware’s
dominance. His criticism encouraged then-Governor of New Jersey
Woodrow Wilson to promote the Seven Sisters legislation, which
contributed to the migration of firms from New Jersey to Delaware.94
President Taft directed his Attorney General to draft a federal licensing
bill,95 which was endorsed by the Wall Street Journal in 1908 and
presented to Congress in 1910.96 Federal chartering and federal licensing
incorporation and Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of federal licensing). See also MORTON KELLER,
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933,
at 26–29 (1990) (discussing the appeal of federal incorporation as a response to the argument that
“the rise of big business was national in character, and thus required a national government
response”).
91. President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1901).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375 (1903).
93. Dorrance Dibell Snapp, National Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. Rev. 414, 415 (1910–1911) (quoting
President Theodore Roosevelt, Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1905)).
94. See Sarath Sanga, The Origins of the Market for Corporate Law 3 n.11 (March 20, 2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3503628
[https://perma.cc/253G-RJHB] (“In 1913, Woodrow Wilson, then governor of New Jersey, proposed
the ‘Seven Sisters Act,’ effectively outlawing the trust and holding company.”); Cary, supra note 7,
at 664 (“Delaware, seeking new sources of revenue, copied very largely from the New Jersey act to
establish its own statute. Then in 1913, at the insistence of Governor Woodrow Wilson, New Jersey
drastically tightened its law relating to corporations and trusts with a series of provisions known as
the seven sisters. Since Delaware did not amend its statute, it took the lead at that time and has never
lost it . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the
Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 167 (2004) (explaining how Woodrow Wilson’s Seven
Sisters Act created a migration from New Jersey to Delaware).
95. See Urofsky, supra note 88, at 180.
96. Id. (“On January 7, 1910, Taft sent a message to Congress calling upon it to pass a federal
incorporation law. . . . Attorney-General George W. Wickersham soon afterward presented a draft to
the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, who sponsored it as the Clark-Parker
bills (S. 6186 and H. R. 20142).”); see also RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION 67 (1976).
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are not the same. Although chartering and licensing have some similar
characteristics and goals, as discussed later in Part V, there are important
distinctions. Federal chartering effectively means that state chartering will
either cease for certain corporations or will be superseded. Meanwhile,
federal licensing does not eliminate the need for state charters, but
imposes additional requirements on companies engaged in interstate
commerce. The 1904 Democratic, 1908 Republican, and 1912
Democratic platforms each included different federal corporate chartering
or licensing proposals.97
The federal incorporation debate rekindled in the 1930s, when the New
Deal produced significant reforms, particularly federal securities laws.98
The post-World War II era witnessed an explosion of legislation and
reform that subsumed the corporate chartering debate to some extent. The
1970s witnessed another resurgence of the debate. Consumer advocate
Ralph Nader and others argued that federal chartering would promote
corporate democracy, personal liability for management, stricter antitrust
requirements, and enhanced disclosure standards regarding social,
environmental, and economic impacts.99 During the first decade of the
twenty-first century, two massive pieces of federal regulation, SarbanesOxley100 and Dodd-Frank,101 subsumed the federal chartering
discussion.102
Recently, U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders both
proposed federal corporate chartering. In keeping with the historical
pattern, public concern about corporate concentration and power103 is
97. See Cray, supra note 84, at 303.
98. The primary federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A.
Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 342–47 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 65, at
1126–27.
99. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1127.
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 17, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
102. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 191–224
(2018).
103. See Kiran Stacey, Kadhim Shubber & Hannah Murphy, Which Antitrust Investigations Should
Big Tech Worry About?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/abcc5070-f68f11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654 (last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (summarizing all recent calls to break up big
tech and the current related ongoing investigations); Andy Kessler, Antitrust Can’t Catch Big Tech,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrust-cant-catch-big-tech11568577387 [https://perma.cc/78KH-KHEV] (discussing how the House Judiciary Committee is the
latest group to open an antitrust investigation against big tech, joining forty-eight state attorney
generals, the Justice Department, and the Federal Trade Commission).
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currently amplified by a global health pandemic and widespread racial
unrest.104 All of society’s institutions have come under increased scrutiny,
especially corporations’ role in, and accountability for, economic and
social outcomes.105 Whereas previous cycles of corporate reform and
regulation strengthened the hand of shareholders and contributed to
greater shareholder voice, the contemporary focus targets corporate
accountability for environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related
outcomes.106 In this environment, the power of celebrated companies like
Facebook and Alphabet have become the subject of heightened regulatory
scrutiny following years of relatively lax oversight.107
B.

The Academic Debate

Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance is one of the most debated topics
among corporate law scholars.108 Traditional accounts in the academic

104. Lucy Colback, The Role of the Corporation in Society, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/482a8435-c04c-4be8-9856-941e7ecf128a
[https://perma.cc/7RRVEF44].
105. See Tracy Jan et al., Corporate America’s $50 billion promise, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2021/george-floyd-corporate-america-racialjustice/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021); Paul Roberts, Costco and Boeing, Commit Tens of Millions to
Social
Justice
Programs,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2020),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/local-business/two-of-washingtons-biggest-companiescostco-and-boeing-commit-tens-of-millions-to-social-justice-programs/
[https://perma.cc/5K7EQ4HV]; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, CEOs Lead America’s New Great Awakening, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15,
2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-lead-americas-new-great-awakening-11618505076 (last
visited Sept. 18, 2021).
106. Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and Future of
Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1301, 1342–43
(2019).
107. See Raymond G. Lahoud, Facebook Faces Lawsuit Alleging Discrimination Against U.S.
Workers, 11 NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/facebook-faceslawsuit-alleging-discrimination-against-us-workers [https://perma.cc/H2CA-8M8G]; see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust
Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-googleviolating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/4795-N4KR].
108. See Cary, supra note 7, at 666 (asserting state competition is a race-to-the-bottom benefiting
management, sometimes at the expense of shareholders, and that this state of affairs demands a greater
federal role); see also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (asserting state competition is a race to the top
benefiting shareholders); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 1, at 556 (asserting Delaware has a
monopoly on out of state charters); Fisch, supra note 76, at 1064 (asserting Delaware sustains its
advantage through judge-made corporate law); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar,
Myth] (asserting Delaware is the only state to truly compete for incorporations); Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205,
1208 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination] (asserting Delaware employs price
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literature overwhelmingly focus on and at times overstate potential
domestic threats, such as interstate competition and federal preemption
via a comprehensive corporate code.
En route to determining whether corporate federalism results in optimal
corporate law, most of the debate surrounding Delaware’s dominant
position in state charter competition is based on race-to-the-top versus
race-to-the-bottom theories.109 Generally, race-to-the-top theories contend
that the high quality of Delaware law attracts promoters, managers, and
investors.110 Race-to-the-bottom theorists assert that to attract
incorporating firms and lucrative franchise fees, Delaware and other states
adopt minimal standards that limit manager accountability at the expense
of shareholders.111 These theories are simplistic and do not accurately
describe state charter competition, especially where it is not robust for
large, publicly traded corporations.112
In the 1970s, Ralph Winter and William Cary were leading voices in
this vigorous debate. For Winter, state competition spurs a race-to-thetop, where manager and shareholder interests eventually converge
because managers realize that promoting shareholder wealth lessens the
likelihood of bankruptcy and takeover, which threaten their
incumbency.113 This model generally assumes an efficient market and the

discrimination through franchise taxes and litigation-intensive substantive law); Kahan & Rock, supra
note 2, at 1578 (asserting that Delaware and the federal government complement each other by
working on the areas the other cannot regulate as effectively); Roe, supra note 24, at 2494 (asserting
the relationship between Delaware and federal actors is more important than any state-to-state race);
Roe, supra note 23, at 590 (asserting there can be no pure state-to-state race because of the threat of
federal intervention); Simmons, supra note 2 (asserting that the greatest threat to Delaware’s
preeminence is not domestic but foreign competition).
109. Theories of regulatory competition (e.g., race-to-the-top) reflect the Tiebout Model of
regulatory competition but did not originate among corporate law scholars. See, e.g., Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (predicting
competition between states will lead to an efficient match between demands of citizens for public
goods and public goods supported by the state).
110. Race-to-the-top theories presume manager and shareholder interests converge in the long run
because managers realize promoting shareholder wealth lessens the likelihood of bankruptcy and
takeover, which threaten managerial incumbency. This model, of course, assumes an efficient market
and the absence of other confounding factors. Cf., id.
111. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part) (“Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had removed
safeguards from their own incorporation laws. . . . The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.”
(footnotes omitted)); Cary, supra note 7, at 663 (“Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a
system contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards. This unhappy state of affairs[]
stem[s] in great part from the movement toward the least common denominator . . . .”).
112. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 108, at 684 (“[T]he very notion that states compete for
incorporations is a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract
incorporations of public companies.”).
113. See Winter, Jr., supra note 108, at 275–76.

Simmons (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/11/2021 4:01 PM

THE FEDERAL OPTION

957

absence of other confounding factors.114
Alternatively, Cary contended that reliance on incorporation fees for
revenues led Delaware to “race for the bottom” with other states, adopting
laws that favored managers over shareholders.115 His deep and incisive
critique extended to proposing federal legislation to establish a Federal
Minimal Standards Act that would preempt Delaware’s influence.116
Adherents of the race-to-the-bottom view expressed skepticism that
market dynamics would result in optimal corporate legislation.117 Cary
was particularly critical of Delaware lawyers and judges, who, he
asserted, could not be trusted to operate consistently in the national
interest.118 His proposed remedies fell short of federal chartering but
significantly influenced the federal chartering debate.119
Research illustrates that competition between states is not robust and
suggests that Delaware targets large, publicly traded corporations rather
than less lucrative chartering market segments; for example, small and
medium-sized enterprises.120 Moreover, other states’ franchise fee
structures reveal they do not have the same economic incentives to
114. Winter’s race-to-the-top theory did not originate among corporate law scholars and was
influenced by the Tiebout Model of regulatory competition. See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 109, at 418
(predicting competition between states will lead to an efficient match between demands of citizens
for public goods and public goods supported by the state).
115. See Cary, supra note 7, at 664.
116. Id. “[I]n my opinion the time has come for us to consider a Federal Minimum Standards Act.
There has been a deterioration of corporate standards, and I think it is safe to say that Delaware has
been the sponsor and the victim of this unhappy denouement. . . . [T]here has been a race for the
bottom.” William L. Cary, Summary of Article on Federalism and Corporate Law, 31 BUS. LAW.
1105, 1105 (1976).
117. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545
(1984) (arguing that there are major defects in the current laws controlling corporate governance, that
the market for charters prevents the states from correcting these problems, and that the American Law
Institute’s Corporate Governance project should be adopted as the solution); Detlev Vagts, The
Governance of the Corporation: The Options Available and the Power to Prescribe, 31 BUS. LAW.
929 (1976) (arguing that only federal action can improve and simplify corporate law); Note, Federal
Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972) (arguing that the chartering market
has caused states to abdicate their responsibilities to govern corporations, and that federal chartering
is the solution); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation,
31 BUS. LAW. 883 (1976) (arguing that federal law on fiduciary duties of management is preferable
to state law, and that Delaware statutory and case law is over-favorable to management.); Richard W.
Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991 (1976)
(arguing that because of the market for charters, only federal law can adequately regulate managerial
misconduct).
118. See Cary, supra note 7, at 687–88.
119. NADER ET AL., supra note 96, at 69.
120. Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 108, at 1209 (“Delaware uses its uniquely
structured franchise tax to charge a higher incorporation price to public corporations than it does to
nonpublic corporations, and that among public corporations, it charges a higher price to larger
corporations than it does to smaller ones.”).
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compete for corporate charters as Delaware.121
A common theme in the academic literature is the tension between the
respective roles of the federal government and the state of Delaware in the
regulation of internal corporate affairs.122 However, “[f]rom a global
perspective, this approach is shortsighted because the destinies of
Delaware and the nation are intertwined in the face of the common threat
of global competition” and potential corporate migration to foreign
jurisdictions.123 Regardless of differences in scope—external trading and
disclosure versus internal affairs—federal securities laws and state
corporate law share a historical core concern: investor protection.124 In the
contemporary context, the scope is expanding to address broader
stakeholder concerns.125 From a functional standpoint, U.S. corporate
121. See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 108, at 687 (“Other than Delaware, no state structures
its taxes to gain from incorporations or stands to reap substantial benefits from legal business by
attracting incorporations.”).
122. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1576 ([T]he possibility of federal preemption constitutes
a threat to Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times—such as during the recent corporate
scandals—when systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist payoff.”).
123. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221; see also William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114
NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1422 (2020) (“While judges may be more hesitant to extend the internal affairs
doctrine to corporations incorporated in foreign nations, the doctrine has been extended enough to
enable foreign nations to effectively compete with Delaware for corporate charters.” (footnotes
omitted)); Christopher M. Bruner, Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of Delaware’s
Competition 4 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of L., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-29, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530397 [https://perma.cc/9TEQ-YW7A] (“[T]he attractions of Delaware
business entities have not gone unnoticed internationally, and in this context Delaware faces
considerable competition from a range of jurisdictions—perhaps notably various British Overseas
Territories such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, another category of
sub-sovereign jurisdictions active in global corporate and financial services.”).
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Many other sections of the
securities laws explicitly refer to investor protection. See Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b); National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b. The securities laws mention the phrase “investor
protection” or “protection of investor” over two hundred times. Michael D. Guttentag, Protection
from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2013).
125. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act’s CEO Pay Ratio Rule now requires most reporting
companies to provide new disclosures of the median employee’s pay and a ratio comparing the CEO’s
compensation with this value. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html
[https://perma.cc/3BMZ-EXBF]; Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,150 (Aug. 18, 2015)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240, 249 (2021)) (“[W]hile neither the statute nor the related legislative
history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the provision, we believe . . . that [the Pay
Ratio Rule] was intended to provide shareholders with a company-specific metric that can assist in
their evaluation of . . . executive compensation practices.”). But see Press Release, Senator Bob
Menendez, Menendez Applauds SEC Movement on Disclosing CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios (Sept. 18,
2013), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-applauds-sec-move
ment-on-disclosing-ceo-to-worker-pay-ratios [https://perma.cc/LH6P-SPKX] (“We have middle
class Americans who have gone years without seeing a pay raise, while CEO pay is soaring. This
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governance is a mixed system involving the interaction of state law
competition with federal intervention (or the threat thereof).126 According
to domestic and international observers, “Delaware’s key contribution to
U.S. corporate governance is the production of substantially judge-made
corporate law—a public good providing dynamic guidance to
multinational firms and practitioners as well as a deterrent for wayward
business behavior.”127 By “routinely deciding these business disputes,
Delaware courts—through well-established precedents—influence
domestic and foreign courts as well as corporate stakeholders
worldwide.”128
C.

Corporate Power, Shareholders, and Stakeholders

Accountability remains the threshold issue in corporate governance. In
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means address its two dimensions: (1) the internal minimization of
agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control
between diffuse shareholders and managers, and (2) the external abuse of

simple benchmark will help investors monitor both how a company treats its average workers and
whether its executive pay is reasonable.”). In August 2012, the SEC issued a conflict minerals
reporting requirement––in fulfillment of Dodd-Frank § 502––aimed at protecting human rights in
Africa. The rule requires publicly traded companies and foreign issuers using conflict minerals––like
gold, tantalum, tin, etc.––to disclose their usage to the SEC to determine whether any of their products
contain conflict minerals. See Fatima Alali & Sophia I-Ling Wang, Conflict Minerals Disclosure
Requirements
and
Corporate
Social
Responsibility,
CPA
J.
(July
2018),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/18/conflict-minerals-disclosure-requirements-and-corporatesocial-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/NVK3-8ZPG] (“In the quest to improve corporate
responsibility efforts and support the global trend of addressing human rights and supply chain risks,
advocates of sustainability have turned their focus to the area of conflict minerals.”). Public Benefit
Corporation statutes are another example of stakeholder influence. See David A. Katz & Laura
McIntosh, The Corporate Form for Social Good, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 24,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/24/the-corporate-form-for-social-good/ [https://per
ma.cc/55VL-ATLF] (“State legislation allowing the establishment of benefit corporations—for-profit
companies with a stated public purpose—has become widespread over the past decade. This
increasingly available corporate form provides a mandate, and a safe harbor, for corporate leaders to
pursue societal good along with shareholder profits.”).
126. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221; see also Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1499–508 (recognizing the
potential of federal intervention as a detriment to state law competition and international competition);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1578 (proposing state and federal regulation complement each other
by regulating in areas where the other cannot).
127. Simmons, supra note 2, at 221.
128. Id. at 222; see also Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34
J. CORP. L. 771, 786 (2009); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 212 (2011) (“The judicial opinions
that result from frequent litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network, because such
opinions provide firms with interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate law.”).
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corporate power at the expense of society at-large.129 The first,
shareholder-centric dimension has dominated the corporate governance
debate in the United States for the past fifty years, while U.S. scholars
have only relatively recently accepted the latter, stakeholder dimension,130
which reflects a populist uneasiness with concentrations of corporate
power, the lack of accountability for negative externalities, and broader
stakeholder concerns.131 Proponents of federal chartering see it as a
mechanism to make the exercise of corporate power more accountable.
Historically, “[l]egal debates over corporate social responsibility
stretch from the 1930s to the twenty-first century.”132 The academic
discussion can be traced to the Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s,133 but
amidst contemporary social, economic, and political upheaval, scholars,
policymakers, and the public are paying renewed attention to stakeholder
concerns.134 Skeptics contend that “stakeholderism” is either shareholder

129. See BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 10, at 11–13, 17–18.
130. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–41 (2001) (asserting the most prominent global corporate governance paradigm
is shareholder wealth maximization). But see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The
Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 (2006) (defining
“stakeholder” as any group of individuals impacted by corporate actions, regardless of whether such
group desires corporate profit maximization); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual
Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274 (1999) (asserting corporate decisions often implicate non-shareholder
concerns).
131. In discussing the populist uneasiness with growing corporate power, one scholar noted:
The progressive alternative, which is derived from the stakeholder theory of the corporation,
suggests that corporate managers’ underlying social obligations are more extensive than
maximizing shareholders’ wealth within the confines of the law. Specifically, progressive
scholars contend that directors . . . ought to consider the implications of their actions on
employees, consumers, suppliers (in some cases), the community, and the environment.
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716 (2002); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 333; BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra
note 10, at 11–13, 17–18 (examining the consequences of separation of corporate ownership and
control).
132. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002).
133. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) (arguing that corporate managers should be legally compelled to make decisions benefiting all
stakeholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932) (countering Berle by arguing that corporate managers only owe a duty to their
shareholders to maximize stock price); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (countering Dodd by arguing that in practice
corporate managers affect more than just their stockholders and should be under legal control).
134. See Lucian A Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
106 CORNELL. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2020); Colin Mayer, Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism—A
Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by
Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L. Working Paper, Paper
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primacy under another name or a creative attempt to limit the
accountability and broaden the discretion of directors.135 They believe that
the current corporate law regime offers no incentives to promote
stakeholder welfare against shareholder concerns.136 They also argue
attempts to do so could hurt stakeholders by reducing the incentives for
direct, external stakeholder-focused regulation.137 Skepticism about
director incentives, stakeholder claims, and corporate actions to address
them raises relevant and salient points. However, such speculation is not
an adequate defense of the status quo.138
Stakeholder proponents fall along a continuum. At one end, they
contend that the concentration of corporate power and adoption of a
myopic perspective upholding shareholder primacy requires an aggressive
overhaul of the existing corporate law framework.139 They view it and

No. 522/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617847 [https://perma.cc/Z96Z-2Z38]; see also
Martin Lipton, Directors Have a Duty to Look Beyond Their Shareholders, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6e806580-d560-11e9-8d46-8def889b4137 (last visited Aug. 27,
2021); Jessica C. Pearlman, COVID-19 Pandemic Highlights Need for Stakeholders to Be
Considered,
A.B.A.:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/04/covid-stakeholders/
(last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (“[T]he interconnectivity of various aspects of the economy [––workers,
firms, investors and governmental officials––] is more apparent now during our current global
[COVID-19] health crisis. . . . This interconnectivity means we are all the stakeholders. Shorttermism hurts us all. We cannot focus on short-term profits alone over the long-term health of the
business or over the needs of employees, the needs of the planet, or the needs of the community to be
able to get back to health.”).
135. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 134, at 91.
136. See generally id.
137. Id. at 100 (“[W]ith corporate leaders having incentives not to benefit stakeholders at
shareholders’ expense, . . . delegating the guardianship of stakeholder interest to corporate leaders
would not be supported, but rather impeded by the force of economic incentives. . . . [A]ccepting
stakeholderism would be substantially detrimental to shareholders, stakeholders, and society.”).
138. See generally Richard W. Painter, Board Diversity: A Response to Professor Fried (Apr. 11,
2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824245 [https://perma.cc/Q6T3-REQ9].
139. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1772–73 (2006)
(explaining the short-term approach to investment); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (2002) (explaining the collapse of Enron in terms of
risk-prone policy, short-term decision-making); Martin Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis & Jay W. Lorsch,
The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009”, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(May 12, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/the-proposed-shareholder-bill-ofrights-act-of-2009/ [https://perma.cc/2YWF-PS9W] (“Short-termism is a disease that infects
American business and distorts management and boardroom judgment.”); Robert G. Eccles, Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Timothy Youmans, Purpose with Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 16, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/202 0/05/16/purposewith-meaning-a-practical-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/P8SS-N7PC] (“If companies and
institutional investors are serious about responsible, sustainable wealth creation in a manner fair to all
corporate stakeholders, . . . [then it] will require a new governance form that makes a company’s
obligations to fulfill its purpose enforceable.”).
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Delaware’s de facto agency status as an impediment to stakeholder
governance.
At the other end, proponents contend that stakeholder governance,
involving a balancing of interests, is consistent with existing corporate
law frameworks, particularly the business judgment rule.140 From this
perspective, corporate law does not mandate shareholder primacy.
Instead, it provides a broader continuum of options for director decisionmaking and considers balancing interests a vital part of the managerial
role.141 Within this framework, directors’ decisions can balance
stakeholder interests and receive business judgment rule protection.142
In essence, shareholder and stakeholder approaches reflect a tension
between two visions of corporate governance: a tight focus on investor
return and a panorama that encompasses all constituencies affected by the
corporate entity. One can find support for either approach in existing case
law.143
140. Martin Lipton, Steve Rosenblum and William Savitt summarize this argument:
Stakeholder governance is fully consistent with well-established principles of corporate law and
the existing fiduciary duty framework for directors. The directors of a corporation have a
fiduciary duty to promote the success and value of the corporation, and the means and time
horizon for achieving such goals are within the purview of the board’s business judgment.
Furthermore, the exercise of balancing competing interests and risks to pursue the best interests
of the corporation is the very core of business judgment, and the decisions of unconflicted
directors, acting upon careful deliberation, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule.
Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & William Savitt, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in
2020: A Mid-Year Update, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 2, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020-a-midyear-update/ [https://perma.cc/5Q9W-EX7A]; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 733 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999).
141. Blair & Stout, supra note 140, at 305 (“[A] broad interpretation of the business judgment rule
that permits directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to those of other corporate constituencies
‘ties the hands’ of shareholders in public corporations in a fashion that ultimately serves their interests
as a class, as well as those of the other members of the corporate coalition.”).
142. Jessica C. Pearlman, Interview with Marty Lipton, 75 BUS. LAW. 1709, 1719 (2020) (“There’s
no statute in Delaware that says the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to maximize value for the
shareholders.”).
143. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(“Although such considerations [of other corporate constituencies] may be permissible, there are
fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation of
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s
stockholders.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having
chosen a for-profit corporate form, . . . directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the
benefit of its stockholders.”); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“Directors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders
which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation
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The present political moment, characterized by broad calls to address a
global pandemic, racial injustice, socio-economic inequality, corporate
concentrations, and ESG factors will likely result in corporate reform.144
The more challenging question is what form will it take. One can argue
that corporate governance is inherently political. The vast power of
corporations, vested in a bureaucracy led by a small management group,
affects society in myriad ways.145 Thousands of routine corporate
decisions have significant and far-reaching public impacts but are often
anonymous and largely insulated from external second-guessing.146 The
robust data set of history makes clear that corporate power should be a
matter of public concern.147 The checks on a corporation’s economic
for the benefit of its residual claimants.”). But see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985) (Directors can consider the “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas,
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1150) (outside a
change of control, “a board of directors ‘is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value
in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.’”); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,
Nos. CIV. A. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“[D]irectors in pursuit
of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other ‘corporate
constituencies.’ . . . There is a time, however, when the board’s duty becomes more targeted and
specific and its range of options becomes narrower.”).
144. Martin Lipton, Steve Rosenblum, and William Savitt discuss the far-reaching effects of recent
socio-political events:
Indeed, the codependencies and interconnectedness between stakeholder well-being and
corporate well-being have been elucidated by the systemic shock from the COVID-19 pandemic.
That shock has prompted not only an economic and social reset, but also a governance reset
insofar as it has underscored the logic and benefits of ESG and stakeholder governance—not
only in terms of reputational capital, but also in terms of the impact on operations, corporate
culture, employee morale, customer and supplier relationships and other building blocks of
corporate value.
Lipton et al., supra note 140; Martin Wolf, How Covid-19 Will Change the World, FIN. TIMES (June
16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9b8223bb-c5e4-4c11-944d-94ff5d33a909 [https://perma.cc/
67PQ-WJER]; Colback, supra note 104; Kathryn Dill, CEOs and Big Businesses Speak Out on
Racism, Police Violence, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2020, 10:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceosand-big-businesses-speak-out-on-racism-police-violence-11591050109
[https://perma.cc/EC3J5XMF].
145. See Walter Frick, The Conundrum of Corporate Power, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2018,
https://hbr.org/2018/05/the-conundrum-of-corporate-power [https://perma.cc/44L8-8LUD].
146. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1128–29; see also Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and
Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 38, 46
(1960).
147. Ronald Alsop, Corporate Scandals Hit Home, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2004, 10:39 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107715182807433462 [https://perma.cc/FD73-PE4R] (discussing
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power include, inter alia, competition, profits, political intervention, and
public consensus or sentiment.148
Historically, proponents of federal chartering have come from both
stakeholder and shareholder constituencies. Diverse stakeholder
constituencies sought federal chartering to address a range of corporate
problems, such as firm concentration, employee disempowerment, and
corporate political activity, and to promote disclosure of economic, social,
and environmental impacts.149 Shareholder constituencies sought it as a
way to enhance corporate democracy and managerial accountability
through reforms, such as cumulative voting, eliminating staggered boards,
and nonvoting shares.150 Changes in the law to enhance shareholder voice
over the past twenty-five years have strengthened their hand, particularly
for institutional investors, and may have eliminated a strong base of
support for federal chartering.151
Although federal chartering has been proposed for more than two
centuries, other, less intrusive methods of regulation have prevailed.
Why? Does this historical failure dim prospects for success in the current
climate? The short answer is yes. In the continuum of regulatory measures
to address corporate governance (Fig. 1), self-regulation is at one end and
complete government control at the other. Within this context, federal
chartering for some observers is a bridge to greater government control
and command of business enterprises, making it a less feasible political
option.152

the public’s distrust of corporations following waves of accounting scandals starting in the early
2000s); Philip Augar, Corporate Scandals Demand a Shake-Up in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/570b60b2-1ece-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c (last visited Aug.
27, 2021) (“In the past few years, scandal has affected many businesses in the FTSE 100, such as BP,
BAE Systems, GlaxoSmithKline, HSBC, Tesco and Rolls-Royce, and elsewhere such as Toshiba,
Volkswagen and Wells Fargo.”); Emily Flitter, The Price of Wells Fargo’s Fake Account Scandal
Grows
by
$3
Billion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/business/wells-fargo-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/8XME
-WCEL] (discussing recent three billion dollar settlement by Wells Fargo following discovery of
fraudulent employee activity from 2002 to 2016).
148. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 52–59 (1954).
149. Id.
150. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1127–28.
151. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2010) (explaining proponents of shareholder empowerment gained
significant political traction after the 2008–2009 financial crisis).
152. See generally Winter, Jr., supra note 108; infra note 186 (discussing failed federalization
proposals).
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Figure 1
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Supply and Demand Dynamics of Corporate Reform

A supply-and-demand paradigm in which lawmakers supply law and
regulation to corporate constituents elucidates lawmakers’ incentives and
how corporate constituents evaluate the efficacy of corporate reform
services.153 This analysis helps us to predict the form regulation may take.
The “government as order-taker” analogy is too simplistic to account for
the complex relationship between lawmakers and corporate
constituents.154 They exchange political capital, and the fact that it is less
transparent than prices in other buyer/seller contexts does not undermine
its importance.155 Among corporate constituents like managers, political
capital is an “intangible asset that provides corporations with long term
value extending beyond an isolated policy issue [or dispute].”156
Similarly, lawmakers are incentivized to maximize political capital by
generating broad political support.157 Arguments asserting that proposed
regulation is efficient, inefficient, necessary, unnecessary, fair, or unfair

153. The exchange of political capital is not as fluid as the exchange of monetary currency. In the
typical buyer-seller scenario, for example, the buyer, in theory, may choose other goods and services
if in a position to do so. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 328–29.
154. See id. at 322 (quoting Sam Peltzman, George Stigler’s Contribution to the Economic Analysis
of Regulation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 818, 828 (1993)).
155. Id. at 329 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2005)).
156. Fisch, supra note 155, at 1498 (describing a case study of FedEx to illustrate the various ways
corporations buy and use political power); see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 329.
157. Simmons, supra note 22, at 329.
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must also “show what is ‘in it’ for the political actors when they move” in
a particular direction.158
On the surface, it seems rational for lawmakers to target the most
lucrative consumer segment—that is, managers and institutional
investors.159 Yet the less visible credence characteristics of corporate
reform allow lawmakers to satisfy many constituencies simultaneously.160
Lawmakers have “a broader set of options to address populist outrage and
market instability,”161 which is salient because the perception of the
corporation as a quasi-public institution has elevated the status of public
opinion in the contemporary corporate governance discussion.
Even though the public opinion concept is imprecise, ascertaining
general public sentiment is an informative exercise for boards, executives,
and lawmakers alike. Public opinion functions as a crude measure of
public legitimacy for corporate governance.162 It tends to be cyclical and
intense.163 But it does not always “spring immaculately or automatically
into people’s minds”; it may be partially manufactured.164 In and of
themselves, citizen demands may not have a significant impact on
corporate conduct, but such demands are more likely to be successful
when coupled with lawmaker intervention or the threat thereof.165
Politics can disrupt markets, but it also has the power to mediate
economic turmoil. Corporate scandals, social unrest, and severe
“economic disruptions often change the distribution of political power and
create opportunities for public policy entrepreneurs to rearrange things to
158. See Peltzman, supra note 154, at 824.
159. Id.
160. Simmons, supra note 22 at 330 (“Because credence characteristics make lawmaker
motivations easier to camouflage, corporate constituents, particularly those with greater informational
constraints, find it difficult to determine clear winners and losers. By the time these corporate
constituents discern the impact of a particular regulation, public outrage has waned, only to reappear
in the future.”).
161. See id.; MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE AND CREDENCE
GOODS 53 (2007).
162. As Adolf Berle asserts, “a modern American corporation understands well enough that it has
a ‘constituency’ to deal with. If its constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go to
the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board of directors or corporation management
would take the position that it could afford to disregard public opinion—or would last very long if it
did.” BERLE, supra note 148, at 56.
163. Id. at 57 (“A disadvantage (not peculiar perhaps to a political as contrasted with an economic
balancing force) is the fact that movements of public opinion tend to be sluggish in commencing, and
extreme once they start. A situation has to be really out of hand before public pressure begins to assert
itself, and when it does passions run high.”).
164. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION 53 (2001).
165. Mark Roe’s description of “backlash” acknowledges the importance of broader public
sentiment beyond the manager-shareholder constituency. See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 217, 217 (1998); Simmons, supra note 22, at 331.
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their advantage.”166 Diffuse constituencies, despite lacking organization,
may nonetheless participate in the political process when they are
provided with “free (and easy to digest, perhaps entertaining)
information” and “political saliency, a major national issue that
commands attention and motivates action in the absence of political
organization.”167 The influence of social media has amplified this effect.
The present political moment is ripe for policy entrepreneurs. “For
lawmakers, the pragmatic outcome to this scenario is a compromise
among various interests, albeit slanted to preserve a broad coalition of
support, thereby maximizing lawmaker utility.”168 Therefore, “the
corporate regulatory framework . . . is laden with policies that seem
economically inefficient and resemble a placebo rather than a cure.”
Meanwhile “[e]fficient [or fair] regulation may lack political appeal, and
at times, merely symbolic or inefficient policies have more political
utility.”169 To limit the backlash generated by economic shocks, scandals,
and social unrest, seemingly “inefficient legal structures may arise and
survive, despite the fact that they could not withstand a normal efficiency
[or fairness] critique.”170 Strategic inefficiency, on balance, may be a net
positive. Its political value is not diminished by the fact that the amount
of political backlash averted from corporate entities or the necessary
amount of political accommodation cannot be measured with any degree
of precision.171 Lawmakers’ pursuit of self-interest and maximization of
political utility may actually benefit shareholder and stakeholder
constituencies.172 From this perspective, reform outcomes in practice are
not simply zero sum, but can include win-win and lose-lose scenarios
among multiple stakeholders.

166. SAM PELTZMAN, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION AFTER A DECADE OF
DEREGULATION, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 58 (William
C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1989).
167. Id. at 51–52.
168. Simmons, supra note 22, at 323.
169. Id.
170. See Roe, supra note 165, at 217 (1998) (“The prospect of backlash—or of strategically
tempering otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more destructive backlash—
complicates a law and economics inquiry.”).
171. See id. at 240.
172. See id. at 238 n.40 (expressing doubt over whether executive compensation fits this pattern
because excessive CEO pay might simply be an agency cost, not a necessary feature to firm
productivity).
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III. FEDERAL CHARTERING PROPOSALS
A.

The Nader Group Report of 1976

Whereas Winter and Cary dominated the academic debate regarding
charter competition in the 1970s, Ralph Nader and his co‐authors Mark
Green and Joel Seligman brought chartering proposals into the
mainstream political discussion. Their 1976 report, Constitutionalizing
the Corporation: The Case for Federal Chartering of Giant
Corporations,173 cited a range of justifications, including: (1) costly
market and nonmarket impacts;174 (2) oligopolistic company behaviors
negatively affecting consumers;175 (3) externalities, such as
environmental pollution;176 (4) claims that Delaware had sold its law to
the largest corporations in exchange for substantial franchise fees;177
(5) insubstantial corporate statutes; and (6) the oligarchic rather than
democratic features of large company governance.178 Admittedly,
proponents knew that addressing these problems would require not just
federal chartering, but a robust and prescriptive chartering statute
containing a variety of provisions to influence the internal governance of
large corporations.179 The Nader group proposal had four substantive
sections targeting corporate governance, disclosure, corporate monopoly,
and an Employee Bill of Rights.180 It would apply to corporations with
173. Simmons, supra note 22, at 365; Robert M. Smith, Nader Group Urges the Federal
Chartering
of
Big
Corporations,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
1976),
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/01/25/archives/nader-group-urges-the-federal-chartering-of-bigcorporations-five.html [https://perma.cc/NR9Y-2NE6]; Ralph Nader & Mark Green, Corporate
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1979), https://www.nytimes.com/1979/12/28/archives/corporatedemocracy.html [https://perma.cc/FAC4-C5A6].
174. Smith, supra note 173 (“Because our largest corporations have such costly market and nonmarket impacts, large companies are ‘effectively private governments huge oligopolies [that]
dominate industry, restrict consumer choice’ and force the ‘consumption’ of air pollution and
poisonous substances.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (“Because the present chartering system has failed. ‘Delaware, in cornering the charter
market, has effectively sold its law in order to charter the largest corporations and to reap substantial
franchise fees.’”).
178. Id. (“Because the management of large companies more closely ‘resembles an oligarchy than
a democracy,’ since in practice the major executives of the companies control the boards of directors
rather than the reverse. The report quotes Prof. Bayless Manning, a noted student of corporate law,
who said: ‘We have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.’”).
179. Id.; see Nader & Green, supra note 173.
180. NADER ET AL., supra note 3, at 86–326. Nader and other federal chartering proponents also
hoped that their federal chartering proposal would become part of the democratic party platform in
an election year. Id.
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U.S. revenues more than $250,000,000 “in any one of the previous three
years, or employ[ing] more than 10,000 persons in the United States in
any one of the previous three years and, in either case, . . . listed on a
national securities exchange or held of record at least 2,000 American
shareholders.”181
One feature was a full-time, independent board to monitor the
corporation.182 It required nine directors, each representing a particular
constituency: employee welfare, consumer protection, environmental
protection and community relations, shareholder rights, compliance with
law, profits and financial integrity, purchasing and marketing,
management efficiency, and planning and research.183 The proposal went
beyond enhanced financial disclosures to include social impact-related
disclosures.184 The Employee Bill of Rights called for free speech,
privacy, and discrimination protections,185 and the corporate monopoly
sections sought to discourage future concentrations and undo existing
concentrations by means that included divestiture.186
Ralph Nader was skeptical of both corporations and government. He
promoted the concept of public citizens, or “people who devote all or
substantially all of their time to public interest activities.”187 They operate
as a third way to constrain large corporations. Public citizens are often
public-interest lawyers who function as private attorneys-general, pushing
government to hold corporations accountable by imposing sanctions and
181. Id. at 391.
182. Id. at 86–214.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 215–99.
185. See id. at 321.
186. Id. at 384–89. On April 2, 1980, the Corporate Democracy Act was introduced in the U.S.
House of Representatives. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980). It did not propose a federal chartering
mechanism and followed a federal minimum standards approach closer to that advocated by William
Cary. See id. Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) was the primary sponsor. Id. There were
seven co-sponsors: Frank Thompson Jr. (D-NJ); Ted Weiss (D-NY); Robert Kastenmeier [D-WI];
John Conyers Jr. (D-MI); Charles Rangel (D-NY); William Clay (D-MO); Don Edwards (D-CA). Id.
It was read and then assigned to three committees: Commerce, Judiciary, and Education & Labor, but
no actions were taken in any committee. Id. That same year, on April 16, 1980, another corporate
reform bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate: the Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980.
S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980); see also Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980: Hearing on
S. 2567 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 96th Cong.
39–53 (1980) (statement of Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Masur, Professor of Law, Yale University)
(testifying to the challenges of federal chartering). This bill did not contain a federal chartering option
but did follow an approach more akin to William Cary’s federal minimum standards. See S. 2567.
Similar to the Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, the bill did not advance in committee and was never
enacted. See S.2567 - Protection of Shareholders Rights Act of 1980, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/senate-bill/2567/actions?r=18&s=1 (last visited Sept.
23, 2021).
187. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 73.
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prohibitions that a government agency might be reluctant to address.188
Unlike other approaches, the public-citizen concept shows little deference
to, or faith in, government actors. Instead, it recognizes that government
and its regulations may actually strengthen the hand of large corporations.
Nader, in essence, proposed tools for self-help and protection in the public
interest.189
B.

The Warren Plan (The Accountable Capitalism Act of 2018)

On August 15, 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the
Accountable Capitalism Act (S. 3348) (ACA),190 which mandates federal
chartering.191 Some of its ideas originated with the Nader Group.192 Its
proposed federal chartering regime is intended to limit state law—that is,
Delaware’s influence—regulating the internal affairs of large, powerful
corporations; all companies, public and private, with $1 billion in
revenues would have to secure a federal charter.193 To an extent, its
provisions resemble the benefit-corporation statutes that proliferate in
over thirty states, requiring management to consider and balance
stakeholder and financial concerns.194 In these other state jurisdictions,
promoters, investors, and managers can choose benefit-corporation status
among a range of entity options. However, under the ACA, a benefit
corporation-like federal charter is mandatory for certain large
corporations.195 Additional provisions under the ACA would give workers
a greater voice in corporate management; allow employees to elect at least
40% of corporate directors; require 75% of directors and shareholders to
approve political expenditures; and prohibit directors and officers from
selling company shares within five years of receiving them or within three
years of a company buyback.196 The bill was introduced, referred to
committee, and no further action was taken. Coincidentally (or not), it was
introduced in advance of a presidential election.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
191. Id.; see also Letter from Cornell Univ. L. Sch. to Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Aug. 15, 2018).
192. See generally Smith, supra note 173.
193. Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-onlyto-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/UXA7-A43B].
194. Compare S. 3348, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2020), and CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 14600–14631 (2019).
195. S. 3348 § 4.
196. Id.; see also Letter from Cornell Univ. L. Sch. to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, supra note 191.
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The Sanders Plan (Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan)

Senator Bernie Sanders’s “Corporate Accountability and Democracy”
plan includes a federal charter mandate for U.S. corporations with over
$100 million in annual revenue, at least $100 million in balance-sheet
total, and all publicly traded companies.197 This threshold is much lower
than that of the Warren Plan.198 The Sanders plan requires boards to
“consider the interests of all of the stakeholders in a company—including
workers, customers, shareholders, and the communities in which the
corporation operates.”199 In addition to federal chartering, it seeks a range
of measures to strengthen workers’ power, including greater and more
diverse employee representation on boards200; wealth-sharing with
employees; promoting employee ownership of corporate enterprises; and
banning stock buybacks. The plan is explicit in its attempt to shift the
corporate balance of power away from managers and large shareholders
toward workers and other stakeholders.201
IV. THE EFFICACY OF FEDERAL CHARTERING VERSUS
DELAWARE’S DE FACTO AGENCY STATUS
Contemporary federal chartering proposals are strikingly similar. They
rest on a perception that federalism—cooperation between the federal
government and the states—has failed to create legal standards that hold
managers sufficiently accountable to the corporations’ constituencies.202
They commonly address business concentration; strengthening the voice
of shareholders through a range of governance mechanisms; promoting a
broader stakeholder view of corporate governance, including, inter alia,
mandating that managers balance the interests of corporate constituents,
197. Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüeller, Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination
and the Democratic State 10–11 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper, Paper No. 536, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3680769 [https://perma.cc/VTJ5-ZN4L].
198. See id. at 11 (“The Sanders proposal would cover all 3,437 public-traded corporations that
were headquartered in the United States and included in the CRSP/Compustat Merged database for
the year 2019, the most recent year for which data are available. By contrast, the Warren proposal
would only extend to 1,235 entities, even though it also covers limited liability companies . . . .”).
199. Sanders, supra note 5.
200. See Dammann & Eidenmüeller, supra note 197, at 12 (“Under Senator Warren’s Accountable
Capitalism Act, employees would elect 40% of all corporate directors. The Sanders proposal calls for
employees to choose 45% of all corporate directors.”).
201. Senator Sanders sponsored similar, though less expansive, legislation in 2019, which required
employers who ordered the closing of a plant or facility to offer its employees an opportunity to
purchase the closing facility through an employee stock-ownership plan or an eligible worker-owned
cooperative. The bill was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, but no
further action was taken. See S. 1661, 116th Cong. (2019).
202. See generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459 (1938).
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especially stakeholders; making provision for shareholders to advance the
social aims of the corporation through derivative litigation; allowing
private enforcement—private actions brought by non-shareholder
constituencies—rather than relying on public enforcement agencies that
may be “unwilling or simply too overburdened to do their job”;203
expanding employee rights and representation in governance;204 creating
more democratic governance procedures within the corporation; and
providing enhanced disclosures related to stakeholder impacts.205 These
goals aim to check managerial power and increase managerial sensitivity
to stakeholders’ concerns.
Federal charter statutes akin to contemporary proposals like the Warren
plan would unquestionably be disruptive. They would consistently apply
one-size-fits-all federal standards to many large corporations. Their
prescriptive approach diverges from the Delaware state law’s enabling
framework and from traditional spheres of state and federal influence (i.e.,
internal and external affairs).206 At the extreme, they might completely
undermine and displace Delaware’s de facto agency status in regulating
the internal affairs of large corporate enterprises. Corporate litigation
might migrate from Delaware state courts, which have a well-established
track record of resolving disputes between large, publicly traded
companies, and move to federal district courts. Moreover, Delaware’s
economy and, to a lesser extent, other states’ economies, would suffer a
significant loss of franchise fees, especially from large, highly capitalized
companies. Without them, Delaware and other states, via their
legislatures, might lose incentives for long-term investment in state court
systems.
A.

Implementation and Logistical Challenges

Federal chartering proponents often envision a dual system: companies
would incorporate in a state, but certain large companies would also be
required to secure a federal charter. This approach could capture both
large, private and listed companies, and federal corporate law would likely
preempt state law. Recognizing implementation challenges, federal
chartering proposals, such as the Nader Group Plan and the Warren Plan,
suggested that Congress focus on immediate legislation addressing

203. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1142.
204. Dammann & Eidenmüeller, supra note 197, at 12 (“Under Senator Warren’s Accountable
Capitalism Act, employees would elect 40% of all corporate directors.”).
205. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1142–43.
206. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of
Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 43 (2009).
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corporate power rather than drafting a comprehensive corporate code.
Under the Warren Plan, companies must comply or face serious
penalties or sanctions, including, but not limited to, charter revocation.207
A mandatory federal charter with the possibility of revocation is a harsh
remedy with wide-ranging implications affecting customers, suppliers,
and workers as well as management. Some type of pilot program
involving a trial or control group of corporations may be necessary to test
the plan’s impact before wholesale implementation. Some companies may
want the option to revert or reincorporate in another jurisdiction.
Contemporary federal chartering proposals envision a new federal
apparatus to oversee chartering and enforcement. For example, the
Warren Plan envisions the creation of an Office of U.S. Corporations, with
the U.S. Department of Commerce and other agencies, particularly federal
courts and the SEC, contributing to its enforcement.208 Yet the
enforcement details and dynamics of a stakeholder-influenced governance
regime remain unclear under contemporary federal chartering proposals.
Additionally, the Warren Plan’s skeletal provisions leave open many
questions regarding complexity, coordination, bureaucracy, and
implementation. For example, would shareholders bring actions on behalf
of stakeholder constituencies? Would stakeholders have the standing to
bring private actions? Or both? Any law that would broaden the horizons
of corporate law would require significant study and deliberation by a
diverse set of represented interests. Through a special task force or acting
through its committees, Congress could synthesize competing views and
make recommendations.209
B.

Politicization of the Internal Corporate Structure

Corporate influence undeniably raises political considerations for
many constituencies and interests.210 Federal chartering proposals raise
difficult questions about how broadly or narrowly to conceive a
corporation’s constituency and accountability. A long-standing critique of
stakeholder governance has been the potential politicization of the internal
corporation (e.g., board composition) and resulting costs to shareholders.
Compared to internally focused corporate law reforms, externally
imposed stakeholder driven business regulations (e.g., environmental and
labor regulation) receive less pushback and are viewed as the cost of doing

207.
208.
209.
210.

Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 9 (2018).
Id. § 3.
Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1159.
Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1537–39 (2018).
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business.211
No formula can precisely calculate how corporations factor their many,
diverse stakeholder interests into firm governance. Their investor base is
diverse even before stakeholder interests are added to the mix. However,
the idea that focusing on diverse stakeholder interests will undermine
shareholder interests is too simplistic. In some situations, yes, but on
certain issues, their interests may converge. Millions of investors hold
retirement accounts. They have an interest in stock returns as well as
sustainable corporate practices that have long-term social, political, and
economic impact on their quality of life.212 To some observers, the market
is the neutral, apolitical, measurable, and rational arbiter. Even if it is
imperfect, speculative, and sometimes trendy, the singular goal of
maintaining stockholder primacy seems more workable to them than
accommodating wide-ranging stakeholder interests and vacillating
political behavior. The lines between long term shareholder wealth
maximization and broader stakeholder concerns are often blurred. Rigid
attachment to a singular goal of profit maximization, no matter how
imprecise, ignores the need for greater flexibility and hybridization to
meet the demands of the contemporary context.
C.

Adversarial Versus Cooperative

Federal chartering legislation assumes that cooperative federalism in
the area of corporate governance is a failed experiment. Yet the absence
of federal chartering does not preclude stakeholder influence through
other mechanisms. From a political standpoint, decoupling the federal
chartering option from other federal stakeholder-oriented measures may
be (and has been) strategically useful for stakeholder advocates, especially
given concerns about implementation and the paucity of evidence that
federal chartering and federal adjudication will yield improved, if not
mixed, results. Federal chartering is only one of many ways to influence
corporate governance.213 A fair assessment of the interplay between
Delaware and the federal government requires acknowledging the

211. See generally Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate
over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363 (2021) (“The public law aspects of corporate law . . . are
primarily the domain of federal securities regulation. Investor protection, mandatory disclosure, board
structure, regulation of material nonpublic information, and many other aspects of publicly traded
corporations are regulated by, or under the supervision of, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.”); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.4 (1986) (distinguishing between
traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations).
212. Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 20–22 (Univ. Pa. Inst. for L. &
Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019).
213. See Birdzell, Jr., supra note 14, at 318.
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possibility that it may yield benefits in the corporate governance arena.214
With its enabling approach, Delaware may be able to respond to
innovations with more nuance, whereas at the federal level, a one-sizefits-all approach with prescriptive rules might prevail. Even if the current
federal-state regulatory framework is insufficient, it can be amended to
better address concerns of multiple stakeholders.
D.

Additional Concerns

Finally, the socio-political context in which modern federal chartering
reform proposals operate is important for determining their efficacy. An
interesting and related question is whether the argument for federal
chartering is supported by today’s legal, political, and business
environment.
1.

Proliferation of Social Enterprise Statutes

The present availability of social enterprise statutes in most U.S.
jurisdictions may either undercut or support arguments in favor of
mandatory federal chartering. States have created social enterprises, such
as public benefit corporations in Delaware, to better address stakeholder
concerns.215 Some states have adopted a benefit corporation statute that
resembles the model statute created by B Lab, a nonprofit corporation that
has been instrumental in promoting benefit-corporation statutes
nationwide and provides B-Corp certifications.216 Other states like
Delaware and Colorado have adopted benefit-corporation statutes that call
for the consideration of stakeholder issues but still preserve a more
shareholder-centric enabling framework.217

214. Compare Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism
for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 295–96 (2009) (“There are . . . potential
gains from federal [corporate] law . . . including the likely higher level of expertise that would arise
from a pooling of resources.”), with Lawrence A. Cunningham, The New Federal Corporate Law?,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009) (“If the portion of corporation law addressing primarily
managers and shareholders were produced in Washington, [then constituencies lobbying for imposing
laws on corporations through antitrust, bankruptcy, labor, tax, and environmental law] would come
into direct play and into more direct political conflict.”).
215. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 17, at 354–55.
216. A benefit corporation is an actual type of chartered entity, meanwhile a B-Corp is a
certification issued by B-Lab to an existing entity. About B Lab, B LAB,
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-lab [https://perma.cc/T74R-QFD9]; see also Simmons, supra note
17.
217. Simmons, supra note 17; see also Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine & Timothy Youmans, 3
Ways to Put Your Corporate Purpose into Action, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 13, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/05/3-ways-to-put-your-corporate-purpose-into-action [https://perma.cc/97ZC-
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Against this backdrop of state experimentation, a mandatory federal
chartering regime seems superfluous, especially when Delaware and other
jurisdictions already offer a menu of options to socially-minded
enterprises. States implemented these stakeholder-oriented statutes in
response to investor appetites and perhaps in fear of federal preemption
or more intrusive regulation. Their proliferation can be characterized as a
form of democratic experimentalism, where states serve as laboratories to
identify better practices and determine a scalable model for
multijurisdictional or national implementation.218 As yet, states’
experiences with social enterprises, particularly benefit corporations,
remain nascent.219 Arguably, more time and data are needed to observe
their operation and the litigation surrounding them. In theory, the study of
state experiences with benefit corporations might strengthen the case for
future federal chartering proposals.
2.

Rise of Impact Investing and ESG Factors

The rise of impact investing with an environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) emphasis leverages nonregulatory means—for
example, shareholder voice—to influence corporate practices and

5PHA] (“If the Business Roundtable supports conversion of their public companies to this model,
their mere ‘trust us, we care’ words will become those of accountable leaders who embrace an
enforceable obligation to others. But corporate leaders cannot succeed unless institutional investors,
such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard, and organizations like the Council of
Institutional Investors also walk their talk on corporate purpose and on the value of stakeholders.
These and other large investors have demonstrated that their voting clout can move the market. If they
support public companies in converting to benefit corporation status, our corporate governance
system can change for the better—fast.”).
218. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A]
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”). Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel expound this idea in
creating a new form of governance called “democratic experimentalism” where “power is
decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to
their individual circumstances, but in which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors
to share their knowledge with others facing similar problems.” Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); see also Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997)
(discussing the use of “collaborative governance” where failure and experimentalism is embraced).
219. While no Fortune 500 companies have yet reincorporated under Public Benefit Corporation
(PBC) statutes, younger companies have adopted a benefit governance system. See Frederick
Alexander, Real Change in Real Time: Benefit Corporations See New Interest, B THE CHANGE:
S’HOLDER COMMONS (July 14, 2020), https://bthechange.com/real-change-in-real-time-benefitcorporations-see-new-interest-82918ba14048 [https://perma.cc/8ZZ4-9NDQ] (“[T]he shareholders
of publicly traded Amalgamated Bank recently approved benefit governance at their annual meeting.
Lemonade, an innovative insurance broker backed by SoftBank, Sequoia and other venture capital
funds, completed the most successful IPO of 2020, rising 139% on its first day of trading (after pricing
above the underwriters’ range).”).
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policies. Institutional investors held only 6% of the U.S. equity market in
1950 and 37% by 1980.220 Today, they hold an estimated 80%.221
Observers contend that the movement for ESG investing originates from
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment issued in 2004 under the
leadership of Secretary Kofi Annan. Approximately two-thousand money
managers signed on to the principles, including BlackRock, the Vanguard
Group, UBS Group, State Street Global Advisors, and Fidelity.222 The
appetite and preference for impact investing continue to grow. It is
especially popular among two large demographic groups: millennials
(86%) and women (84%).223 Millennials represent a potential $12-$30
trillion in future wealth assets.224 To put that number into perspective, the
S&P 500 today accounts for $20 trillion.225
Impact investing reflects some convergence between shareholder and
stakeholder interests but falls short of perfect alignment given the need to
balance financial return with social impact and inevitable intertemporal

220. See JANICE M. TRAFLET, A NATION OF SMALL SHAREHOLDERS: MARKETING WALL STREET
AFTER WORLD WAR II 174, tbl.E.3 (2013) (chronicling the New York Stock Exchange’s efforts to
broaden the country’s shareholder base during the Cold War); Brian Reid, The 1990s: A Decade of
Expansion and Change in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, INV. CO. INST. PERSP., July 2000, at 1, 15
(explaining institutional investor equity ownership).
221. See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Apr. 25, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/
170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/V53V-8LXD] (analyzing
institutional ownership of companies).
222. These are the five largest investment management companies worldwide, together managing
over $22 trillion dollars. Tim Lemke, The 10 Largest Investment Management Companies Worldwide,
THE BALANCE (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/which-firms-have-the-most-assetsunder-management-4173923 [https://perma.cc/6EE8-3KB7]; Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INV., https://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatory-resources/signatory-directory [https
://perma.cc/4BH9-MWR8].
223. MORGAN STANLEY INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, SUSTAINABILITY SIGNALS 4, 8
(2017), https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/
Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SCZ-DDXB].
224. See Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion
Market Just Getting Started, CNBC (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/
your-complete-guide-to-socially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/MR37-97EZ] (“More
than 2,250 money managers who collectively oversee $80 trillion in assets have now signed on to the
United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment.”); see also Steve Chiavarone, This Is
How Millennials Are Shaping the New Economy, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2019, 4:13 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/02/this-is-how-millennials-are-shaping-the-new-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/H69P-7U8G?type=image] (“According to Morgan Stanley, 84% of millennials cite
investing with a focus on ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) impact as a central goal.”);
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020).
225. Yashaswini Swamynathan, The S&P 500 Is Worth $20 Trillion for the First Time, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/sp-500-market-cap-crosses-20trillion-for-the-first-time-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/P6LF-NRJW?type=image].
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choices and trade-offs.226 Compared to federal chartering, it remains a less
intrusive, stakeholder-influenced mechanism that falls within the market
paradigm.
Decisions pertaining to ESG do not differ much from other decisions
subject to the business judgment rule, provided some impact on, or link
to, long-term value can be identified.227 Such decisions “might include
how corporations respond to climate change, how good they are with
water management, implementing effective health and safety policies to
protect against accidents, managing supply chains, [and] how they treat
their workers.”228
Some skepticism attaches to ESG efforts. A common critique is that
they may reduce shareholder profits and limit director accountability.229
Evidence of long-term value-performance gains would bolster and
insulate most ESG-related decisions from challenge. In any case, some
ESG proponents question whether money alone should be the driving
force and want to shift from a financially motivated system of shareholder
226. See Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Short-Termism and Intertemporal Choice, 96 WASH. U. L.
REV. 495, 507 (2018) (“Short-termism is sometimes characterized in broad brush strokes as the bane
of corporate governance, creating a misleading impression that elevates long-term strategies as
aspirational and short-term choices as suboptimal. Such characterization is too simplistic and
misleading . . . . Managers routinely make intertemporal cost-benefit choices.”); see also TIM
KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE
VALUE OF COMPANIES 13 (6th ed. 2015) (noting the tradeoffs managers make between short-term
profit and long-term value). While the interest of shareholders and stakeholders do not align perfectly,
there has been some recent evidence suggesting the adoption of ESG standards has largely been driven
by shareholders and proxy advisory firms. Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business
Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 647, 679-81 (2016); Robert G. Eccles
& Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2019, at 106,
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution [https://perma.cc/5NBF-49M4].
227. CLARK, supra note 26, § 3.4 (“[T]he business judgment of the directors will not be challenged
or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences
of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes—
unless certain exceptions apply.”); see also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 290 (3d ed.
2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable
for . . . business decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might disagree.
This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically involve taking calculated
risks.”).
228. Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest Decision: Historical Insights on Civil Rights and
the Future of Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1291 (2019) (quoting Georg Kell,
The Remarkable Rise of ESG (July 11, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/20
18/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/?sh=62ae7cab1695 [https://perma.cc/WJW3-4TZC]).
229. Gillian Tett, Why ESG Investing Makes Fund Managers More Money, FIN. TIMES (July 8,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1cfb5e02-7ce1-4020-9c7c-624a3dd6ead9 [https://perma.cc/4NL
V-HHAM]; see also Feifei Li & Katrina Sherrerd, Unlocking the Performance Potential in ESG
Investing, RSCH. AFFILIATES (Mar. 2018) https://www.researchaffiliates.com/en_us/publications/art
icles/659-unlocking-the-performance-potential-in-esg-investing.html [https://perma.cc/6P5GQX4C] (explaining that empirical studies are inconclusive as to whether ESG actually impacts shortterm value, but preliminary long-run evidence indicates value gain).
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primacy to a broader, social-good, stakeholder-based system.
Critics also contend that the present narrative “greenwashes” or
exaggerates commitment to environmental and social issues. They note
the discrepancy between stated goals and their achievement and the lack
of standard criteria to measure ESG effectiveness.230 New measurement
and data collection tools are emerging.231 However, a looming question
remains concerning the extent to which institutional investors will enforce
company specific ESG goals.
3.

Evolving Expectations for Corporate Managers

Today’s directors are more professional, skilled, and effective than
their predecessors, but their progress does not undermine arguments for
federal chartering. From Allis-Chalmers232 to Caremark233 and to the
present, expectations for how directors should carry out their oversight
duties and general workload are evolving.234 These changes reflect the

230. Stefanie Perrella, Julianne Recine & John Ward, ESG and Private Funds, BLOOMBERG L. 2
(2020), https://www.duffandphelps.com/-/media/assets/pdfs/news/esg-private-funds.pdf?la=en&has
h=143DF4900047286846C0CD0B2E2A2A9BB54F5D8A [https://perma.cc/P7YH-GDYT].
231. See, e.g., Lorie Konish, Morgan Stanley Launches New Tool to Let Advisors, Investors
Measure Sustainable Investing Goals, CNBC (July 29, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/20
19/07/29/morgan-stanley-offers-new-tool-to-let-advisors-measure-esggoals.html#:~:text=Morgan%20Stanley%20is%20offering%20a,Quotient%2C%20was%20announc
ed%20on%20Monday [https://perma.cc/GE8C-2GHR]; Measuring the Immeasurable: Scoring ESG
Factors, GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.gsam.com/content/gsam/global/en/market-insights/gsaminsights/gsam-perspectives/2015/esg/qis-article.html [https://perma.cc/XD4J-X6QJ].
232. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
233. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
234. Compare Allis‐Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130 (“On the contrary, it appears that directors are
entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them
on suspicion that something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of the directors
might well follow, but absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect
exists.”), with In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt
in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to
do so . . . may . . . render a director liable for losses incurred by non‐compliance with applicable legal
standards.”), and Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019) (“As with any other
disinterested business judgment, directors have great discretion to design context- and industryspecific approaches, . . . [but] Caremark does have a bottom-line requirement that is important: the
board must make a good faith effort—i.e., try—to put in place a reasonable board-level system of
monitoring and reporting.”). See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 444, 446 (2003) (“[M]y
personal view is that the expectations of directors . . . progressed in the thirty-plus years from AllisChalmers to Caremark.”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1436 (2005) (describing changes to standards of director
conduct under state law as “evolving expectations.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Counseling
Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2004).
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interplay of federal and state law and illustrate how the federal
government’s regulation in a particular area can lead to or influence the
development of law in Delaware. The Caremark decision, recognizing a
duty to implement a system of controls, was made in the broader context
of federal sentencing guidelines and increased federal guidance on
accounting and other corporate control systems.235
Directors are expected to play a prominent role in decision-making and
monitoring. They must dedicate more time; participate in audit,
compliance, nominating, and compensation committees; follow more
procedures; and reflect greater expertise and competencies than ever
before.236 The number of corporate disclosures and the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts reflect increased federal
encroachment and greater willingness to regulate the internal affairs of
U.S. corporations.
These changes inform contemporary boardroom dynamics. Under an
array of reforms and the influence of activist institutional investors,237
directors use formal and informal mechanisms to ascertain the sentiments
of their investor base and to avoid conflict where possible (e.g., director
no-votes and litigation).238
4.

Risk of Capital Migration

Federal chartering raises the risk that companies and capital will
migrate to foreign jurisdictions. Delaware law and adjudication form an
important part of the U.S. corporate governance system to which firms
subscribe. The Delaware brand is world-renowned and from a global
standpoint, enhances rather than diminishes the national reputation. It
encourages, rather than discourages, foreign investment. From an investor
and management standpoint, Delaware’s predictability, political stability,
and certainty are cherished virtues for business planning. To the extent
that investment decisions are influenced by the legal environment,
Delaware, as de facto regulator and forum for dispute settlement, is part
of the U.S. legal environment.239 Within this context, Delaware seems
more of an asset than a liability.

235. Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 234, at 1436–37.
236. See Jay W. Lorsch, Understanding Boards of Directors: A Systems Perspective, in 2 ANNALS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Douglas Cumming & Geoffrey Wood eds., 2017).
237. Lin, supra note 210, at 1597–98.
238. Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1710–11 (2011).
239. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 223–24; Strine, supra note 2, at 683–84; Savitt, supra note 2,
at 586.
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Political Considerations

William Cary’s critique of Delaware’s role as de facto regulator
stemmed, in part, from the concern that the state’s General Assembly and
judiciary were captured and lacked the independence to render objective
decisions in the national interest.240 Ironically, this perspective does not
adequately address similar interest group and capture concerns that
resonate at the federal level. It also fails to acknowledge the strong
incentives for Delaware actors to be perceived as apolitical and how the
mere threat of federal encroachment may serve as a check.241 The recent
U.S. Supreme Court case, Carney v. Adams, draws attention to the
political balancing that characterizes Delaware’s courts and the
importance of being perceived as apolitical in its de facto regulator
function.
E.

Special Circumstances that May Warrant Federal Chartering

Despite asserting that federal chartering is not merited at this particular
historical moment, this Article does not hold that it should always remain
impermissible. In certain circumstances, more intrusive structural
mechanisms like federal chartering may be warranted.
1.

Successful Experimentation with Social Enterprise Statutes

Democratic experimentalism, a facet of new governance theory, may
eventually support federal chartering.242 Under the classic state-laboratory
argument, if benefit corporations were to grow in popularity and success,
the states’ benefit-corporation chartering regimes might serve as a model
for a federal approach to chartering. Such an effort would be contingent
upon corporate constituency preferences and political support that is
unlikely in the current environment. Additionally, extensive litigation and
longer-term data on benefit corporations are lacking. However, initial

240. See Cary, supra note 7, at 679–80.
241. Adams v. Carney, No. CV 17-181-MPT, 2018 WL 2411219, at *2 (D. Del. May 23, 2018),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom. Carney v. Adams, __ U.S.__, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309), vacated and
remanded, Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) (arguing that Delaware’s political
balancing requirement should be maintained); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding a duty to implement a system of controls within companies
following passage of federal sentencing guidelines).
242. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism (Searching for Contemp.
Legal Thought, Working Paper No. 14-549, 2017).
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research indicates that such companies attract significant investment.243
The growth of benefit corporations will depend upon impact
investment and whether impact investors migrate to them or opt for
traditional corporate forms. To the extent that the existing corporate
governance regime, composed of large, publicly traded corporations
adopts ESG standards that incorporate stakeholder concerns, investors
may not feel the need to seek out alternatives. Less support for state
benefit corporation chartering translates as less support for federal
chartering. From another vantagepoint, the proliferation of state benefitcorporation statutes may obviate the need for a federal chartering system.
Under the present system, companies can voluntarily opt-in to benefitcorporation status, but it is not mandatory. Choice matters and the
coexistence of benefit-corporation status among other entity types may
better capture the preferences of promoters, managers, and investors.
2.

Significant Government Support or Bailouts

Another instance where federal chartering might be mandated is when
a large company receives a major benefit from the federal government,
such as bailout funds—a loan, majority investment, or insurance.244
Typically, a lender, investor, or insurer will want some type of return or
premium in exchange, and the recipient company may lose some degree
of control, be required to provide some type of assurance, or pay a
premium.
Generally, bailouts “are socially desirable because Congress cannot
anticipate the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante
insurance system that regulates behavior and charges firms in advance for
liquidity support.”245 However, they are “intensely controversial.”246 The
primary policy goal underlying bailouts is stopping systemic risk, but we
have no consensus definition of what amounts to a systemic risk.247 Other
implicated policies include fairness and limiting moral hazard and
administrative cost. First, some observers contend that promoting fairness
243. Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Future or Fancy? An
Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations 49 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 495/2020,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433772
[https://perma.cc/5H8J-LX6J].
244. See Eccles et al., supra note 217 (suggesting companies be compelled to adopt PBC status in
exchange for a federal bailout).
245. Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 479, 482 (2015).
246. Id. at 496.
247. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 446 (2011) (“Exactly what level
of impact is unacceptable is a variable matter; one observer might judge a risk to be systemic, another
not.”).
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is not a mere moral gesture but “lends legitimacy to the government
action” and “constrain[s] government abuse and cronyism.”248 Political
legitimacy plays an important role in the public’s acceptance of bailout
measures,249 so their structure must be “clear and maximize political
accountability.”250 Fairness requires “bailouts for ordinary individuals
rather than corporations or those with political connections whenever
possible.”251 Second, many scholars call for bailouts that limit the risk of
moral hazard.252 The reason “bailouts can create moral hazard [is] because
firms that expect to be bailed out will be incentivized to engage in overly
risky behavior because the downside risk is socialized, while the upside
is retained.”253 Third, bailouts must factor in administrative cost.
According to one observer, the government must “choose the most
straightforward way to inject bailout funds into the system.”254 Doing so
may cut against the fairness rationale because “as the number of bailout
recipients increases, the government must [likely] spend more money on
administrative costs.”255
Consequently, bailouts may involve circumstances where more
intrusive structural corporate governance restrictions and guidelines in the
form of mandatory federal chartering are warranted. Consider the bailouts
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during the Great

248. Anthony J. Casey, Large Corporations Did Not Need a Bailout, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (April
14,
2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/04/14/large-corporations-did-not-need-abailout/ [https://perma.cc/9YAG-Q27T].
249. Levitin, supra note 247, at 447 (“Political legitimacy is critical for ensuring that government
responses to financial crisis are effective. Serious crises often require repeated government actions,
and the perceived legitimacy of one governmental action affects the government’s range of actions in
the future.”); see also Wake Forest Law Events, Sager Speaker Series with Kenneth Feinberg
9/28/2017, YOUTUBE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pnZ8OlMx9Y [https://pe
rma.cc/AXC4-DUTZ] (discussing the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the controversy
surrounding bailing out banking institutions).
250. Levitin, supra note 247, at 491.
251. Casey, supra note 248.
252. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND.
L.J. 951, 959 (1992) (“A thoughtful bailout policy must take this moral hazard problem into
account.”); Levitin, supra note 247, at 440 (“[H]aircuts on creditors are essential for limiting
government losses, reducing moral hazard. . . .”); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case
for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1366 (2011) (“Bailouts must be linked
with investment returns and conditions, both to cover the government’s assumption of risk and to
mitigate moral hazard.”). But see Casey & Posner, supra note 245, at 526 (“[T]he moral hazard
problem is partly self-correcting and largely exaggerated.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool:
Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 774 (2017) (“[M]oral
hazard does not cause systemically important firms to engage in excessively risky behavior.”).
253. Levitin, supra note 247, at 481–82.
254. Casey, supra note 251.
255. Casey & Posner, supra note 245, at 532.
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Recession.256 Under TARP, bailout relief came with executive
compensation and corporate governance restrictions.257 Taxpayers
ultimately received a return on their investment, yet the program was
criticized because “while achieving a measure of short-term stability,” it
“failed to address certain underlying issues that may wreak havoc on the
financial sector and the broader economy in the not-too-distant future,”
such as moral hazard and the perception of unfairness.258 Scholars have
argued for placing corporate governance-related restrictions on
companies receiving bailouts up front.259 A potential condition for a large
corporation to receive bailout assistance could include federal chartering
among other structural reforms.
A hypothetical candidate for federal chartering might be an airline or
other large transportation companies that provide a public service and
receive a major government bailout, subsidy, or contract. In exchange for
government support, the company would have to secure a federal charter
for a particular period of time or until certain conditions attached to
256. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111ST CONG., DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING
STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 81 (2009); Pepper
Culpepper, America’s Bank Bailouts Worked, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014, 11:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/americas-bank-bailoutsworked/ [https://perma.cc/J5NV-TGLE] (“The United States actually got the big details of the bailout
right – and for this reason, American taxpayers made money on the deal: about $8-10 billion,
excluding the non-bank parts of the bailout.”).
257. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(2) (“The Secretary shall require each TARP recipient to meet appropriate
standards for executive compensation and corporate governance.”); Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock–
Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 484–85 (2010)
(describing how the Department of Treasury utilized a Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, to oversee
all TARP participants executive compensation).
258. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 256, at 82. The COP report explains that, although
TARP boosted the economy, it produced negative consequences: “[a]nother [negative] consequence,
however, was to signal to the market that, going forward, the government may step in to provide
bailouts to certain systemically significant institutions—such as financial institutions and auto
manufacturers—should they face the risk of failure. As a result, the market has been distorted in a
way that could, absent responses outside of the TARP, plague the financial sector and the broader
economy for the foreseeable future.” Id. at 85; see also Wake Forest Law Events, supra note 249.
259. Manns, supra note 252, at 1391; see also Levitin, supra note 247, at 512 (asserting
government bailouts should come with “control over corporate governance” which “could guarantee
better governance without actual government involvement”); Saule T. Omarova, Why We Need a
National Investment Authority 3–4 (Cornell Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 20-34, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3566462 [https://perma.cc/9LDS-TDR4] (asserting the need for a National
Investment Authority which would condition emergency relief, such as a bailout, on specific changes
to the internal operations of a company and have the ability to enforce such conditions with a “golden
share”); Scott W. Singer, Asserting Government Control over Subcontractors, 1994 ARMY L. 11, 12
(1994) (explaining that the Federal Acquisition Regulations contain mandatory flow-down provisions
for all government contracts that allow the government to assert some degree of control over both the
party they directly contract with, the prime contractor, and the subcontractors the prime contractor
chooses to subcontract with.); id. at 12–14 (explaining flow down provisions address a range of issues
from security to socio-economic issues).
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government support were met.
3.

Amnesty for Corporate Entities

Another instance when a company might be required to reincorporate
under a federal charter would be as a condition pursuant to a government
settlement agreement to prevent the imposition of stiffer civil and criminal
penalties. By analogy, companies and other entities enter into
prosecutorial agreements, consent decrees, and other settlement
agreements with government authorities where they agree to undertake
certain measures.260 Federal chartering could be such a measure.
Additionally, companies might sua sponte, in the absence of an active
investigation or settlement, secure a federal corporate charter to prevent,
ex ante, more severe penalties in the event of a violation. For example, a
company’s compliance program can serve as a mitigating factor under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations.261 Here, amnesty might
provide a potential incentive to secure a federal charter.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL CHARTERING

As mentioned, federal chartering stands at one end of a continuum of
methods to regulate corporations. It requires more than simply tampering
with the regulatory process, and the case for it is weakened by the
availability of less radical measures, including: (A) a federal licensing
regime; (B) a federal corporate code that almost completely displaces
state corporate law; (C) incremental corporate legislation, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank; (D) direct stakeholder
regulation of business enterprises; (E) state benefit-corporation statutes;
(F) market forces (e.g., labor, capital, investor activism, and reputational
shaming); and (G) self-regulation.
A.

Federal Licensing

Historically, there was a more robust debate pitting federal chartering
against federal licensing approaches to regulating large corporations.262 A
licensing regime retains state corporation law, but corporations must seek
260. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of
Enforcement U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
261. Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.
pdf [https://perma.cc/F73M-QU7Z].
262. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 84–85; Horace LaFayette Wilgus, Federal License or National
Incorporation, 3 MICH. L. REV. 264, 265–67 (1905).
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a federal license, ostensibly fulfilling established criteria, to engage in
interstate commerce.263 Federal chartering preempts state corporate law
and perhaps the need for state incorporation with federal incorporation.264
The scope of both licensing and chartering regimes could turn on the size
of the corporation, as reflected by a range of indicators, such as revenues
or number of employees. Licensing, like chartering, can be voluntary or
mandatory, but to achieve far-reaching impact, either would have to be
mandatory.
B.

Federal Corporate Code

A comprehensive federal code for corporate law would displace state
law that has traditionally addressed the internal affairs of corporations. In
theory, it could operate in the absence of, or in conjunction with, a federal
chartering regime. For example, vocal Delaware critic William Cary
recommended a federal corporate code but not federal chartering.265
Presently, we have no federal corporate code, but we do have “important
federal statutes (that is, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934) addressing disclosure, insider trading, and
periodic reporting” without generally emphasizing internal affairs.266 A
federal code would ostensibly reflect a broader stakeholder view of
corporate governance because “[c]ompared to Delaware, federal
government lawmaking is more pluralistic and involves more interest
groups reflecting populist concerns.”267

263. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 84–85.
264. It is conceivable for a company under a federal corporate chartering regime to simultaneously
hold a state and federal charter.
265. Cary, supra note 7, at 701–03.
266. Simmons, supra note 22, at 328; see also Roe, supra note 24, at 2498; Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (upholding federal forum selection clauses in several
Delaware companies’ charters regarding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 even after
acknowledging these claims are not matters of “internal affairs” but still are “internal” to the
corporation).
267. Simmons, supra note 22, at 327; see also Roe, supra note 24, at 2518–19. Mark Roe describes
the broader interests implicated at the federal level:
More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-regarding policymakers
in Washington see themselves as custodians for the overall health of the American economy;
accordingly, they could conclude that tight managerial accountability—beyond that which even
interests institutional investors—would be best for the economy. The Council of Economic
Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and the SEC often proposes rules that
managers and institutional investors dislike. Of course, we shouldn’t naïvely think that interests
don’t influence these players too, but the interests differ from Delaware’s, and sometimes the
public-policy players have enough slack to be able to act on their ideological preferences.
Id. at 2503.
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Incremental Corporate Legislation

Over the past two decades, Congress and the SEC have demonstrated
a willingness to influence the internal affairs of corporations more directly
but not by developing a comprehensive federal corporate code that would
completely displace Delaware law. In recent history, partial or
incremental reforms have been used to displace or to fill gaps in Delaware
law rather than more intrusive measures like federal corporate chartering
or implementing a comprehensive federal corporate code. For example,
SOX federalizes rules for the composition of a corporation’s audit
committee, the separation of accounting and auditing services, forfeiture
of executive pay, and prohibitions on loans to corporate executives.268
These rules impact corporate internal affairs. Although the possibility of
mandatory federal chartering or a comprehensive federal corporate code
remains slim, incremental federal encroachment is a real threat to
Delaware’s influence.269
D.

External Federal Stakeholder Regulation

External stakeholder regulation is a common method of regulating
corporate enterprises. The federal government is reluctant to directly
regulate the internal affairs of the corporation; that is, to alter existing
power relationships among managers and shareholders. Instead, it prefers
to use more external and less internally intrusive forms of regulation, such
as disclosure, to prevent political backlash from powerful corporate
constituencies.270 Beyond traditional corporate law, a panoply of other
regulations affect corporations (e.g., OSHA,271 ERISA,272 the Clean Air
Act,273 antitrust laws).274 This broader set of external regulations may

268. Simmons, supra note 22, at 328. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261–66 (2006).
269. Examples of incremental encroachment include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd Frank
Act. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 10, 44–48 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Social
Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1821 (2007); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to
Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 733
(2013).
270. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 284–85, 290
(1990).
271. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78.
272. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
274. See CLARK, supra note 26, at § 1.4 (distinguishing between traditional corporate law and other
laws affecting corporations).
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address stakeholder concerns to a greater degree than state corporate law
and even federal securities statutes. The staunchest shareholder-primacy
proponents acknowledge stakeholder concerns, yet they prefer redress
through external regulations, not core corporate law.275 For example,
federal chartering proponents have historically targeted corporate
concentrations.276 They might wish to consider whether addressing
corporate concentrations is better served within the context of specific
regulatory laws; antitrust laws could directly address the anticoncentration efforts. Decoupling or severing antitrust considerations
from federal chartering proposals might also increase the likelihood of
federal chartering’s adoption.
E.

State Social Enterprise Statutes

In essence, recent proposals for federal chartering impose a mandatory
benefit-corporation structure on large corporations that require directors
to balance stakeholder interests.277 More than thirty-two states have
already implemented benefit-corporation statutes.278 Recent research
suggests that private investment in nascent Delaware public benefit
corporations is significant.279 More experience and time is needed to
discern whether these entities will attract enough capital to affect the
governance practices of major corporations.280 Adopting a de facto federal
benefit-corporation statute seems premature in the absence of more robust
empirical data concerning litigation, investment, and incorporation.281
F.

Market Constraints

In theory, market constraints could make corporate managers
accountable to shareholder and stakeholder constituencies in the absence
of federal chartering. Elite labor markets play a role.282 Executives
worried about their reputation and prospects with present or future
275. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 134, at 94–96.
276. See supra sections II.A–.C.
277. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Smith, supra note 173; Nader
& Green, supra note 173; Sanders, supra note 5.
278. Why Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/ policyma
kers/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation [https://perma.cc/HS4K-5HRQ]; see also Dana
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—a Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV 591, 592 (2011) (describing growth in benefit corporation statutes).
279. J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 581 (2016).
280. Id. at 586.
281. Id.
282. Omari Scott Simmons, Forgotten Gatekeepers: Executive Search Firms and Corporate
Governance, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 807, 821–22 (2019).
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employers will tailor their conduct accordingly. Research shows that
discharged executives have a difficult time securing comparable
positions.283 Executive service contracts could serve as an additional
restraint on managerial shirking and incentivize desirable conduct.284 The
market for corporate control also affects managerial behavior.285 Here, the
acquisition and disposal of controlling interests can serve as a check.
Poorly run companies become subject to takeover, and incumbent
management may be replaced.286 Capital markets influence managerial
behavior and decision making. Access to financial capital is essential to
achieving corporate goals and sustainability. Companies that need to raise
funds via issuing shares or borrowing money will face scrutiny from
investors if the company is poorly run.287 Product and service markets also
constrain management. A company that is poorly run will not satisfy
supply and demand or stimulate demand for its products and services. This
could negatively impact perceptions of management.288 Reputational
283. Rachel Feintzeig, When Chief Executives Become Job Seekers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2014,
12:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-scramble-to-sell-themselves-when-looking-for-anew-job-1393979853 [https://perma.cc/6GT4-HRUW]; see also C. Edward Fee, Charles J. Hadlock
& Joshua R. Pierce, New Evidence on Managerial Labor Markets: An Analysis of CEO Retreads, 48
J. CORP. FIN. 428, 428–29 (2018) (finding the loss of a CEO position typically results in a
“substantially inferior” subsequent CEO position).
284. Hannah Levitt, Wells Fargo Ties Senior Executive Pay to Improving Diversity, BLOOMBERG
L. (June 16, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-16/wells-fargoties-senior-executives-pay-to-improving-diversity [https://perma.cc/HT24-XFLX]; see also Seymour
Burchman, A New Framework for Executive Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/13/a-new-framework-forexecutive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/7EJH-MBAY] (discussing realignment of executive pay
with a company’s mission and purpose as a means to encourage more long-term and stakeholder
focused decisions).
285. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–
13 (1965).
286. See id. at 113 (“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage
the company more efficiently.”).
287. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 889 (1995) (“This
need for financing will expose the firm to the scrutiny of investors in the capital markets and of
investment bankers and underwriters who serve as intermediaries between the firm and the capital
markets.”).
288. Munteanu Claudiu-Cătălin, Florea Dorian-Laurențiu & Pagalea Andreea, The Effects of
Faulty or Potentially Harmful Products on Brand Reputation and Social Responsibility of Business,
16 AMFITEATRU ECON. 58, 60 (2014) (linking “the effects of faulty and potentially harmful products
on brand reputation specific constructs and key outcomes”); see also CNN Business, Volkswagen
Emissions Scandal: A Timeline, YOUTUBE (June 28, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5
TvFY7xRDM [https://perma.cc/YLQ4-S8FR]; WXYZ-TV Detroit, GM Expected to Report
Quarterly Loss Over Ignition Switch Recall, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=b64qr5oV-tc [https://perma.cc/R5DP-XDZT]; Doron Levin, GM Posts Huge Profit Drop
Driven by Ignition Switch Crisis, FORTUNE (Apr. 24, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/04/2
4/gm-posts-huge-profit-drop-driven-by-ignition-switch-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/V9CU-FN4Y].
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concerns are especially acute for consumer-facing companies and brands.
For example, a company’s response to social activism in the current
business climate can threaten its reputation or provide an opportunity to
enhance it. One observer describes this issue as follows:
The broad reach and deep impact of social activism powered by
new information technology means that businesses are frequently
engaged in social issues whether they want to be or
not. . . . [C]hanges in social expectations about corporate
behavior have also altered corporate social activism. Many in
society and within corporations now expect businesses and
executives, particularly those at large public companies, to
engage with the critical social issues of today.289
The failure to account for complex reputational risks may destroy the
long-term value of a company.290 A company under a cloud of litigation,
investigations, and even social media outrage may suffer reputational
damage with serious financial ramifications.
These market-based constraints on managerial conduct, however, have
their limits. An overreliance on market mechanisms is unlikely to
adequately prevent managerial entrenchment, shirking, self-dealing, and
greenwashing.291 A company’s market power may insulate poor
management. The market for executive talent is not that robust and
executives may not face sufficient reputational damage and loss of job
prospects to tailor their behavior. Similarly, the market of corporate
control may not serve as an adequate check on managerial misconduct.
Takeovers are often expensive, cyclical, more likely to happen in good
financial times, and possibly impacted by a range of entrenchment
mechanisms.
G.

Self-Regulation

Some observers argue that adopting a self-regulatory paradigm focused
on long-term value while embracing stakeholder concerns will obviate the
need for more intrusive legislation.292 The threat of a federal chartering
289. Lin, supra note 210, at 1546.
290. Id. at 1579–81.
291. Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the
Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 896–
97 (2013); Reiser, supra note 278, at 611; Fairfax, supra note 238, at 1696–98.
292. Solomon, supra note 64, at 596–97 (describing the basic functions of a regulatory regime);
see also Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Capitalism at an Inflection Point, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/02/20/wachtell-lipton-discussescapitalism-at-an-inflection-point/ [https://perma.cc/YQB7-QK7T] (“The New Paradigm is structured

Simmons (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/11/2021 4:01 PM

THE FEDERAL OPTION

991

statute laden with stakeholder-related measures may strengthen the appeal
of self-regulation; a self-initiated response can forestall more “blunt”
regulatory reforms and, at the same time, contribute to long-term
corporate value and stakeholder welfare.293
Like biological immune systems, the Corporate Immune System (CIS)
includes a range of internal mechanisms to ward off threats. It reflects
firms’ efforts to adapt to growing corporate complexity, threats to
corporate value, and the reality of political compromise.294 Functionally,
CIS performs an internal regulatory function that lowers monitoring costs
for government regulators through such mechanisms as a monitoring
board, compliance and risk management systems, compensation
structures, an enhanced chief legal officer role, and ESG-sensitive
governance.295 These internal measures complement external corporate
governance strategies: markets, litigation, gatekeepers, and top-down
public regulation.296 A well-established CIS, especially when
complemented by engaged regulators and external gatekeepers, is an
important feature of healthy corporate governance in large, publicly
traded companies.297 In today’s socio-political context, companies are
pragmatically adapting to investor and public demands to address
stakeholders’ concerns.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A global pandemic, socio-economic inequality, and broad public calls
to address racial injustices are revealing weaknesses in U.S. economic and
social arrangements. Public sentiment has shifted to support “stakeholder
capitalism.”298 The confluence of these developments is forcing
policymakers to rethink the overlapping roles that businesses, citizens,
and the state will play in the future. These events, although significant,
will not displace Delaware as a de facto national regulator.

to obtain its benefits without the ill-fitting encumbrance of legislation and regulation. It is flexible
and self-executing by corporations and investors adopting it and notifying each other that they have
adopted it.”).
293. See Lipton et al., supra note 140.
294. See generally Simmons, supra note 65.
295. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 110–16 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the benefits of
internal firm regulation); Simmons, supra note 65, at 1133.
296. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 295, at 128–29.
297. Simmons, supra note 65, at 1133.
298. Gavin Hinks, US Public Backs Shift to Stakeholder Capitalism Amid Covid-19, BD. AGENDA
(June
9,
2020),
https://boardagenda.com/2020/06/09/us-public-backs-shift-to-stakeholdercapitalism-amid-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/C47P-CKSL].
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The Shape of Future Corporate Governance Reform

Within this contemporary context, Delaware will remain the “federal
option” for corporate chartering. No federal corporate chartering law has
been adopted despite centuries of debate. And contemporary federal
chartering proposals along with efforts to enact an expansive federal
corporate code likely face a similar fate. Some of the conditions under
which previous proposals for federal corporate chartering came about,
such as significant shareholder support, no longer exist given the
enhanced voice of institutional investors. The relative absence of support
from one of the key historical groups advocating for federal corporate
chartering makes it less tenable from a political standpoint. In the future,
incremental federal encroachment on Delaware law and external federal
stakeholder regulation are likely regulatory responses.299 Self-regulation
via accepted ESG frameworks will also play a prominent role in
mollifying public fervor for more intrusive federal regulation.
B.

The Value of Federal Corporate Chartering Proposals

Despite their lack of success, federal corporate chartering proposals
provide value in important ways.
1.

Looking Beyond the Status Quo Toward Greater Hybridization in
Regulatory Design

Delaware’s effectiveness as a de facto agency, coupled with other
available forms of corporate regulation, renders contemporary proposals
for mandatory or even voluntary federal chartering premature and
superfluous. Notwithstanding, the federal chartering debate prompts a
more robust discussion of alternatives and possibilities beyond the status
quo. It encourages deeper exploration of existing and potential reforms as
well as their interplay. Contemporary federal corporate chartering
proposals reflect a longstanding tension between the exercise of corporate
power and broader stakeholder concerns. This tension underlies the
important trend of hybridization in regulatory design as well as corporate
practice to accommodate the interests of multiple corporate constituencies
with diverse motives.300 Hybridization has been used in a variety of fields

299. For a discussion of incremental federal encroachments and external federal stakeholder
regulation see supra sections V.C–.D. An example of state stakeholder regulation is a recent
California law requiring women be on the board of all publicly held companies. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 301.3 (Deering 2020).
300. ESG and public benefit corporations reflect this hybridization trend.
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as a way to create proposals by blending competing theories.301 As a
theoretical and practical matter, meeting the demands of diverse
stakeholders requires an adaptive hybridized approach to governance
issues. This is a type of evolution; the regulatory architecture is improved
by grafting on the best features from an array of approaches.
The contemporary ESG focus and proliferation of social enterprise
statutes are an outgrowth of this trend toward hybridization. The
emergence of impact investing and ESG frameworks, among the most
significant developments in the past fifty years, requires a hybridized
attention to both financial and social impacts. This landscape is pressuring
federal, state, and firm self-regulatory regimes to accommodate broader
stakeholder concerns.302 A new generation of investors prioritizes
stakeholder impact.303 In response, companies are altering some of their
internal governance practices. Recent events involving the COVID-19
pandemic along with broader calls to address racial and economic
injustice have accelerated demands for regulatory reform and greater selfregulation. A broad, hybridized approach to corporate governance is
demanded, one not limited to shareholder concerns but incorporating a
range of stakeholder constituencies. As one observer acknowledges, “the
current—and likely future—terrain of business and social activism
suggests that a singular narrative centered exclusively on amoral profitseeking would be unsatisfactory for many corporate stakeholders, social
activists, and policymakers.”304 Businesses “should be able to articulate
their profit-seeking purposes in a comprehensive manner that better
accounts for the social interests and norms expected . . . which in turn may
actually lead to superior financial performance” and enhance their value
for employees, consumers, and society at large.305

301. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 349 (2004) (defining hybridization as “drawing
together elements from rival schools of thought” in the context of creating new forms of governance);
Lin, supra note 210, at 1579–80 (“By working on important issues that are at the forefront of society’s
concerns, instead of focusing solely on profit, corporations could enhance their value to consumers,
employees, recruits, and shareholders. Being socially responsible does not mean being financially
irresponsible.”).
302. Similarly, social enterprise statutes require a balancing of stakeholder interests. See Eccles &
Klimenko, supra note 226.
303. Dorff et al., supra note 243, at 27 (“In a recent international survey, some 87% of millennials
said they thought that financial performance should not be the only measure of a company’s
success.”).
304. Lin, supra note 210, at 1597–98.
305. Id. at 1598; id. at 1579–80 (“Being socially responsible does not mean being financially
irresponsible.”).
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Discrete and Severed Elements from Corporate Chartering
Proposals Are Sometimes Adopted

Elements of unsuccessful federal corporate chartering proposals have
been proposed “à la carte” or recycled as part of more successful reform
proposals (e.g., independent directors, enhanced disclosures, etc.). This
phenomenon reveals the cyclical nature of corporate reform and that many
contemporary reform proposals are not novel but often contain elements
of previously unsuccessful reform efforts.306 In this sense, corporate
chartering proposals might signal or foreshadow future reforms.
3.

Functioning as a Bargain Tool

Finally, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool
where the threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform
methods more palatable to diverse corporate constituencies. They prompt
legislators and corporate managers to coalesce around less intrusive,
stakeholder-focused reforms. The threat of top-down regulation and more
punitive sanctions may sometimes be necessary to discipline corporate
actors, to force recalcitrant firms to obey established rules intended to
provide systemic benefits to a broader range of market participants, and
to push firms to address problems through internal self-governance.307
CONCLUSION
The laws from which U.S. corporations are created and acquire their
legal characteristics are largely local. Yet modern corporations have a
global scope and far-reaching impacts on multiple constituencies.
Concentrated corporate power has profound economic, democratic, and
social consequences. From this tension emerges the desire to subject
modern corporations to federal law. Despite the historical and recent
waves of federal chartering proposals, Delaware’s role as a de facto
regulator will likely persist alongside incremental federal encroachment
on the traditional scope of state corporate law. Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank provide the incremental, less disruptive, and politically feasible
template for greater federalization of corporate governance. Despite two
centuries of reoccurring federal corporate chartering proposals, these
proposals have not become law. Similarly, contemporary corporate
306. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 219. See generally Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois,
Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40
AKRON L. REV. 1; Fairfax, supra note 238.
307. Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of New Public Governance,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 535, 553–55 (2010).
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chartering proposals like the Warren and Sanders plans are likely to fail.
They will, however, coincide with other successful types of corporate
reform (e.g., antitrust, labor, climate, and tax reforms as well as political
spending and climate disclosures). These recent chartering proposals and
their context resurrect a seminal question: Can Delaware serve as an
effective national regulator? Yes, with some caveats and qualifications,
Delaware can continue to perform an important agency-like role in
collaboration with federal regulators and regulated firms.
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